

# Causes and Consequences of Pipeline Failure

2<sup>nd</sup> UKOPA Technical Seminar – “Managing the Risk from Pipelines Containing Hazardous Fluids”  
Mike Acton, Principal Consultant

- Introduction
- Causes of Failure
  - Threats and defences
- Consequences of Failure
  - Consequence modelling and validation
- Incidents
  - Case studies
- Full Scale Tests

# Introduction

- Major Accident Hazard pipelines have a good safety record in the UK
- Worldwide experience shows that serious incidents can occur
- Need to understand causes and consequences
- QRA techniques now well established
- Supplements provide framework to support risk-based decisions




- Elements of pipeline risk assessment
  - Failure cause
  - Failure mode
  - Gas or liquid outflow
  - Dispersion or pool spread
  - Ignition
  - Thermal radiation, overpressure, flash fire, toxicity
  - Effects on people
  - Risk calculations



# Causes of Failure


# Threats to Pipelines

- External interference/impact
- Internal and external corrosion
- Material and construction defects
- Natural hazards
- Surge/overpressurisation
- Fatigue
- Sabotage and pilferage
  
- Failure modes
  - Leaks (punctures)
  - Breaks (ruptures)



# Frequency by Cause (CONCAWE 2001- 2005)

- Typically historical failure statistics dominated by
  - Third party damage
  - Mechanical (material & construction)
  - Corrosion




# External Interference

- Generally third party
  - 1st party damage also possible, e.g. during construction or maintenance
- Defences include a range of measures:
  - Pipeline design
  - Burial depth
  - Surveillance
  - Pipeline markers
  - Physical protection
  - Landowner liaison



- Range of mechanisms, e.g.
  - External corrosion
  - Internal corrosion
  - Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
- Defences include:
  - Pipeline design
  - Pipeline coating
  - Corrosion management
  - In-line inspection
  - Cathodic protection



General corrosion



Pitting corrosion

# Material & Construction Defects

- Historically a significant problem due to poor quality of steel and pipeline construction techniques
- Rare for modern pipelines systems due to
  - High quality steel
  - Quality control during pipeline fabrication
  - Improved welding and inspection
  - Hydrostatic testing



# Natural Hazards

- Geotechnical
  - Landslide
  - Subsidence (natural and manmade)
  - Hydrotechnical
- Not generally a major issue for UK pipelines except in specific locations (e.g. former mining areas)






# Consequences of Failure

- Behaviour and effects depend on fluid properties
- Source
  - Gas or liquid outflow
  - Exit conditions
- Dispersion, accumulation or pool spread
- Ignition
  - Immediate or delayed
- Fires (thermal radiation)
- Explosions (overpressure)
- Toxicity (poisoning)



- Rapid depressurisation
- Crater formation
- Pipeline alignment
- Jet release (or releases)
- Initially transient
- Quasi steady at later times
- Decay rates determined by system



# HP Natural Gas Pipelines

- Lighter than air and momentum-driven
  - Releases rise naturally into the atmosphere
- Immediate ignition
  - Transient “fireball” phase
  - Up to ca. 30 seconds duration
  - Followed by quasi-steady crater fire
- Delayed ignition
  - Quasi-steady crater (or jet) fire only



# Dispersion – Liquid Pipelines

- Volatile liquids
  - Vapour denser than air
- Releases have relatively low momentum if impacted
  - Drifting cloud scenario if not ignited immediately



# Ignition – Liquid Pipelines

- Immediate ignition produces jet fire
- Delayed ignition produces flash fire (and possible vapour cloud explosion)



- Sooty flames, high levels of smoke production
- Liquid rain-out and pool fire depending on composition of mixture

# Explosions

- Pressure generated by:
  - Confinement
  - High speed flames
- High speed flames generated by congestion within gas cloud






# Model Validation

# Validation - Incident Comparisons

- Predictions compared with documented incidents.
- Complications due to e.g.
  - Subjective nature of determining burnt area
  - Uncertainty due to fire spread
  - Wide spread in predicted and reported areas observed.



# Validation – Large Scale Testing

- Consequence models developed from theoretical understanding and results from small scale tests
- Many processes scale dependent
- Validate at large scale
- Spadeadam Test Site



# Validation – Full Scale Testing

- 76 km length
- 914 mm pipeline (36")
- 60 bar (880 psi)
- 200 instruments deployed
  - Weather
  - Gas outflow
  - Size and shape of resulting fire
  - Thermal radiation levels
- Maximum flame heights 500 m
- Paper presented at IPC 2000



*A Full Scale Experimental Study of Fires Following the Rupture of Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines  
M. Acton, G Hankinson (Advantica), J Colton, M Sanai (SRI int), B Ashworth (TransCanada PipeLines)*



# Pipeline Incidents

# Belgium, 2004, 40" Natural Gas Pipeline

**ADVANTICA**  
A Germanischer Lloyd Company



**Mechanical damage caused by construction machinery (multiple gouges)**

**24 fatalities, >200 injuries**



**Majority of fatalities – emergency services and construction personnel**

**Majority of injuries – people stranded in vehicles on nearby road**



# Belgium, 2004, 40" Natural Gas Pipeline

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# Belgium, 2004, 40" Natural Gas Pipeline



Type of machine which may have caused damage



# Bellingham, 1999, 16" Gasoline Pipeline

**Rupture of damaged pipeline  
(gouge)**

**Release of  $0.25 \times 10^6$  gallons of  
gasoline**

**Delayed ignition of release**

**3 fatalities, 8 injuries**





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# Bellingham, 1999, 16" Gasoline Pipeline




THE NATION'S NEWSPAPER

# USA TODAY

NO. 1 IN THE USA . . . FIRST IN DAILY READERS

## When pipelines are time bombs

2 million miles  
of them deliver  
potential  
catastrophe  
every day



By Angela Lee Horroch, Bellingham Herald, via AP

June 10, 1999: Three boys were killed in Bellingham, Wash., when a river of fuel exploded.

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