

UKOPA

United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators' Association



IT WILL BE ALRIGHT ON THE NIGHT

Kelvin McIntosh

Process Safety Manager

National Grid

ARE WE PREPARED?

Third party damage is the greatest risk to pipelines

- **But are our mitigation processes robust?**
- **How do we know they will work on the day**
- **Will it be alright on the night?**

THE CATALYST


The main drivers for running fully scale lives exercises:

- **The Fluxys incident in Belgium with 24 dead and approximately 120 people injured**
- **The sale of the gas networks**
- **The extended lines of communication as a result of the network sale**
- **We needed assurance that the whole system would work**


PIPELINE RUPTURE




LEGISLATION



**Gas Safety
(Management)
Regulations (1996)**



**Pipeline Safety
Regulations (1996)**




**Control of Major
Accident Hazards
Regulations (1999)**

In essence they require ... operators to have adequate emergency procedures and effective arrangements to deal with an emergency. operators to ensure that emergency procedures and staff training is of sufficient frequency and depth so that they can be relied upon to work effectively in an emergency.

THE PROOF TEST


How do we demonstrate the emergency arrangements are effective? By testing them!



FULLY MONTY LIVE EXERCISE


Cold call a pipeline damage into the 800 number and let the call make its passage through the system.

Multi step progression successful communications vital




FULLY MONTY LIVE EXERCISE

Alternatively the call may go direct to Gas National Control Centre



INSIDE JOB – PLANT A MOLE



TIMING IS EVERYTHING

- When to run the live exercise?
 - During the working day
 - Evening
 - Weekend
- Out of normal hours does test the response time and the call system.
- Are sufficient resources available in a reasonable timeframe out of normal hours
- Added cost- overtime.
- Critical time- Saturday morning.



LIVE EXERCISE -PLANNING

**Detailed planning
is essential**

**Controls
need to be in place**

**Scenario needs to be
reasonably realistic**

**Ample
scope for things
to go wrong**

LIVE EXERCISE -PLANNING

How far do you want to peel back

Decide the scope of the exercise

- What is to be tested
- How is it to be tested
- Who is to be tested

REAL MEN DON'T USE PROCEDURES

A lack of emergency plans – common shortfall

Staff received training long time ago and have forgotten most of it.

Can't find the emergency plan and are unsure what to do



WHAT IS IN A POST CODE

NTS pipelines in the most part are located in rural areas.

- The Emergency Call Centre computers use post codes
- Very difficult to identify location without a post code
- Manual look for location – adds a time delay and possible location error
- Giving a location without a post code was always part of the exercise.

WALLS HAVE EARS

- True test without warning.
- Need to keep secret.
- Don't put the exercise in electronic diaries.
- Need to know basis.
- People will search for location and date.



SITE VISIT

- Essential part of the planning
- Ensure the scenario is realistic
- Local features that could impact the exercise
- Safe location for vehicles and people to operate



DETAILED PLANNING

SCENARIO EVENT LOG		
Time	Input	Expected Response
9.00 hrs	<p>Report Road Traffic Accident KMc Call the Emergency Call Centre on 0800 111 999</p> <p>This is Exercise Heather and I would like you to treat the information I'm about to give you as if it's real and take the appropriate actions. No messages are to go outside National Grid.</p> <p>Strathclyde Fire & Rescue Service control centre. We have a report that a LPG road tanker has been involved in an accident outside National Grid's Elvanfoot gas compound near Bigger, Lanarkshire. We have two fire crews at the scene and require attendance by National Grid to this location. There are some unconfirmed reports of damage to your equipment.</p>	<p>Ask for contact details from person reporting damage. Precise location of incident, phone number etc. B7040 Leadhills Road, off A702. Junction 14 M74. Elvanfoot, Bigger, Lanarkshire.</p> <p>Ask for any further details 07889 164765 Escalate call to Emergency Call Centre and contact Pipeline Engineer for Scotland and NTS Duty Manager.</p>

EXPECTED RESPONSE

EXERCISE FOXGLOVE – EXPECTED RESPONSE

The following checklist details the main actions that are expected to be completed during Exercise Foxglove. (*Note: actions may be completed in a different sequence to this list.*)

EXERCISE FOXGLOVE ACTIONS				
No	Actions	Responsibility	Comp't	Comments
1	FCO examines mapping system to identify pipe network at incident location	FCO		
2	Report to ECC. Summon assistance e.g. extra FCOs, NG or NGN teams and Emergency Services	FCO		
3	Evacuate property within 500m of incident	FCO		
4	Find safe location to evacuate people and keep list of names	FCO		

BREIFING NOTE

EXERCISE SUNFLOWER

Introduction

As part of the Network Sales process it was recognised that we need to ensure the emergency processes continue to operate in an effective manner. A series of emergency exercises were planned to ensure emergency response process remain effective as the business changes. Exercise Snowdrop was conducted in November 2004 and Exercise Bluebell was held in July 2005.

The next exercise “Sunflower” will be conducted in November 2006 out of normal working hours to test the ability of National Grid to mobilise standby staff and resources to effectively manage the incident and to test the communication routes with the Independent Network’s newly formed work Dispatch.

Aims and Objectives

Exercise Sunflower seeks to confirm the effectiveness of the current emergency arrangements by testing the following areas:-

- The response of the Emergency Call Centre to the report of a potential high-pressure incident and transfer of the information to the Independent Network Dispatch;
- The ability of the First Call Operative to identify the potential risks and secure / evacuate the site;
- Communication routes between the Independent Network and National Grid;
- The ability of Maintenance Delivery – Gas to assess the hazards of the incident and initiate actions to reduce pressure in the pipeline;
- Determine if adequate standby staff, equipment and resources can be mobilised within an acceptable time frame;
- The process for Gas Network Investment, Maintenance Delivery – Gas and Gas National Control Centre to develop and implement a repair and recommissioning plan;
- Determine the time to mobilise resources from the Central Emergency Materials & Equipment scheme (CEME) located at Ambergate Pipeline Centre.

COMMUNICATIONS

Good communications are at the heart of effective incident management.



LESSONS LEARNT

- Expended money, resources and time

Need to ensure the learning are captured

- Too easy to make recommendations and then not implement them

- Close out report recommendations do need to be tracked to ensure implementation.



UKOPA

United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators' Association



ANY QUESTIONS ?

