

Land Use- & Emergency Planning




Contents

- Land use planning
 - HSE role
 - Planning App
 - Consultation
- Pipelines major incidents
- Pipelines & the law
- Emergency plans
- Observations
- Questions
- Guidance


HSE role in land use planning

- HSE is a statutory consultee for Land use Planning
- Preparing and maintaining spatial risk information around:
 - Major accident hazard pipelines (over 28,000 km)
 - Major accident hazard sites (3,500 sites in GB)
 - Explosives sites (310 sites in GB)
- Maintaining the Web App for Land Use Planning consultancy for Local Authorities and commercial developers

HSE LUP Web App



- Local Authority



- Developer


Consultation

- Developer uses LUP planning app
- Highlights whether need to refer to HSE LUP
- LA get zoning information
- ‘Need to contact LA for pipeline operators’
- HSE consultee based on risk
 - Do not advise against
 - Advise against

Consultation

- If consent given despite HSE advising against
 - HSE will generally contact the LA to discuss and lay out concerns
 - Likely request written confirmation from LA as to their understanding/accepting risk
 - Potential for judicial review in extremes
- Pipeline operator can/should raise relevant objections with LA as well

Current data sharing model



- Local Authorities may receive different versions of data
- Local Authorities may handle operator data differently to the HSE.
- Risk of differences in zones

Summary

- Continued co-operation between UKOPA and HSE can improve data-sharing relationships.
- Operator and LA communications
- Not yet at 100% sharing with LA, need sign off by some UKOPA members
- Improvements to data-sharing should lead to no future surprises with contents of annual data refreshes.

lupenquiries@hse.gov.uk

Pipeline major accidents




- High consequence/low frequency events:
 - don't happen often, but when they do...
 - low general awareness of pipeline hazards/risks
 - rare incidents = no experience (corporate memory important)
 - 'it can't happen here' mentality (global learning)
- Experience from abroad shows how catastrophic pipeline MAs can be e.g. Ghislenghien, Belgium, 2004 – 24 dead & 132 injured (incl. first responders)
- Potentially large scale of event means many parties may need to mobilise, co-ordinate & work together effectively
- Requires proper planning and practice

Example of a pipeline major accident



- California, 2010:
 - failure of 30" 26 bar gas pipeline
 - no immediate ignition
 - 8 people killed, 56 injured, 38 homes
- Lack of communication (pre- & post-)
- Confusion among the various responders
- No emergency plans / exercises
- Eventually isolated by off-duty staff on their own initiative
- There was opportunity to mitigate...



Pipelines & the law



In summary:

- Pipelines should be properly designed, built, operated, maintained and eventually decommissioned
- Plan for emergencies
- Specialist area with unique challenges
- Specific set of legal duties reflect this
- Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 - **PSR**

UK legislation: scope of PSR emergency planning requirements



- Legal position very different to US
- Majority of emergency planning duties only apply to major accident hazard pipelines (MAHPs) as defined by PSR Reg 18
- Includes entire 'pipeline' as defined by PSR Reg 3
e.g. for a gas pipeline includes apparatus such as:
 - block valve sites
 - pig trap sites
 - offtakes
 - pressure reduction stations
 - compressor stations

MAHP operator duties: PSR Regs 24 & 25(4)



- PSR requirements:
 - organisation, arrangements & procedures for emergencies in place & documented before MAHP commissioned
 - revision/replacement of emergency arrangements & procedures
 - testing of emergency arrangements & procedures
- provide necessary info to LAs to enable them to prepare emergency plans

Pipeline operator duties: HSE ‘success criteria’ Or



“inspection” what we expect dutyholders to demonstrate.

- Adequate pipeline emergency arrangements in place (required for all pipelines, not just MAHPs – PSR Reg 12 duty)
- MAHP emergency procedures tested, reviewed and revised periodically and in the light of lessons learned from tests
- Competence of key personnel in emergency procedures is assured e.g. PERO training
- Adequate consideration of emergency response in control room design e.g. alarm handling

Pipeline operator duties: HSE 'success criteria' (2)

- Operator carries out checks on the effectiveness of emergency shutdown procedures, including operation and testing of shut off valves
- Effective control room interface and communications between field staff and control room staff
- Leakage detection systems utilised as appropriate

(From Onshore Pipeline Integrity Management - Operational Guidance for Inspectors)

Local Authority duties: PSR Regulation 25



- PSR requirements (MAHPs only):
 - defines timescales for LA to prepare EP following receipt of MAHP notification from HSE*
 - consultation with HSE, pipeline operator etc
 - 3 yearly review/revision of EPs
 - multiple LAs along route can prepare single plan for MAHP
- (Reg 26: allows LA to charge pipeline operator for preparation of EP)

* 9 months from being notified.

LA emergency plans (EPs)




- Approaches to MAHP emergency planning can vary e.g.
 - include MAHPs in general EPs & show how arrangements for MAHPs are integrated into them
 - generic plan for specifically identified pipelines operated by same operator & carrying same fluid
 - single EP for MAHPs in same location or LA area
 - single plan for whole pipeline (may cover >1 LA area)
 - if MAHP connects COMAH sites, integrate into their offsite EPs
- Need to specifically reference each MAHP & operator in EP, irrespective of which approach is followed

In any event, emergency plans should....



- Be clear, simple & easy to understand
- Identify credible scenarios
- Be flexible – potential for incident 24/7 anywhere along pipeline route should be addressed
- Consider risks to public, responders & environment
- Allocate clear roles, responsibilities & resource
- Contain robust communication arrangements
- Recognise LA boundaries
- Dovetail with other relevant emergency plans
- Consider restoration phase of response

JESIP - METHANE



- Reporting framework for emergency responders
- Assists in communication between responders
- Include risk to responders
- [Home - JESIP Website](#)

Observations



- Achievable roles/duties and resource
 - Single control room operator expected to make 12 phonecalls whilst responding to leak and operating other assets
 - No operator attendance at silver/gold
 - Expectations on single PERO
 - Competence/communication
- Be very careful about making assumptions
 - Technical knowledge/acronyms
 - Local knowledge
 - ‘Live’ incident water applied to powder spill

Observations

- ‘Live’ exercises trump desktop
 - Weather, time, darkness, confusion, access
 - Help identify assumptions in the response
 - Test ‘real life’ expectations (mannequins)
 - Test specific parts of plans
- Length of incident – fatigue impact on decisions
- ‘Safe’ exercise at live location
 - Responders removed all PPE at ‘end-ex’ on live gas well site
- Procedures will not be followed to the letter – develop job aids

Observations

- Resource/competence
 - ‘Live’ incident, HSE arrive day two & find continuing high-risk hazard to public
 - Due to insufficient resource and competence on day one
- Pre-emptive communication and invitations
- Do not underestimate the impact of the media and miscommunication
 - Agree lead media cell
- Don’t forget restoration could take months!

ANY QUESTIONS?



Guidance

- Emergency planning for major accidents Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999
(hse.gov.uk)
- A guide to the Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996
- Emergency response / spill control (hse.gov.uk)
- Role of HSE in Civil Contingencies and Cross-Government Emergency Planning Work
- Land use planning (LUP) – public safety advice – HSE
- Further guidance on emergency plans for major accident hazard pipelines
(hse.gov.uk) (quite old so might be out of date)