

LRFs changing remit

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Why do we have a Local Resilience Forum?

“The purpose of the LRF process is to ensure effective delivery of those duties under the Act that need to be developed in a multi-agency environment and individually as a Category 1 responder”

<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/36/contents>



Civil Contingencies Act 2004

CHAPTER 36

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PART 1

LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR CIVIL PROTECTION

Introductory

1 Meaning of “emergency”

Contingency planning

2 Duty to assess, plan and advise

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Civil protection

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General

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8 Urgency: Scotland

9 Monitoring by Government

10 Enforcement

11 Enforcement: Scotland

12 Provision of information

13 Amendment of lists of responders

14 Scotland: consultation

15 Scotland: cross-border collaboration


16 National Assembly for Wales

17 Regulations and orders

18 Interpretation, &c.

Seven duties under the act

1. Co-operation (Cat 1s & 2s)
2. Information Sharing (Cat 1 & 2s)
3. Risk Assessment (Cat 1s)
4. Emergency Planning (Cat 1s)
5. Business Continuity Plans (Cat 1s)
6. Communicating with the public (Cat 1s)
7. Advice to businesses (Local Authorities only)



LRF Cat 1 and Cat 2 responders

Category 1 responders

- Police, Ambulance, Fire, Environment Agency, Councils, Health (ICB, NHS), Coastguard, Acute Trusts, UK Health Security Agency

Category 2 responders

- Health:
- Utilities: (such as) (Electricity providers, Water Companies, Telecomms, Gas)
- Transport: (such as) (Train Operators, Network Rail, Highways),
- Others: Met Office, Coal Authority

Others

- Military, Voluntary groups, British Red Cross, DLUHC...

Framework of Integrated Emergency Management




Figure 1: The Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) Cycle as defined for the UK civil protection sector (©Emergency Planning College)

The Strategic Board	Provides strategic direction to members and sub-groups, actively seeks assurance from the membership, sub-groups and secretariat.
Tactical Business Group	Oversees and enables the operational work, coordinates activities and identifies areas of concern which cannot be resolved without strategic direction.
Operational Groups	Operates in thematic areas, with specific objectives / areas of Local Health Resilience Partnership • Risk Assessment Group • Warn and Inform Group • Business Continuity Focus Group • Blue Lights Group • Training and Exercising Group • Flood Adverse Weather Group • Voluntary Emergency Liaison Group

5	R52(Civil Nuclear Accident),			R21b(Cyber attack – electricity infrastructure), R78(Pandemic),	
4		R48(Loss of Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) services), R73(High temperatures and heatwaves),	R80a(Major outbreak of foot and mouth disease),	R74(Low temperatures and snow), R79(Outbreak of an emerging infectious disease),	R70(Disaster response in the Overseas Territories),
3	R41(Large passenger vessel accident), R53(Radiation release from overseas nuclear site), <u>R60(Accidental fire or explosion at an onshore major incident hazard pipeline)</u> , R62 (Reservoir / Dam Collapse),	R35(Disruption to global oil trade routes), R47(Disruption of space-based services),	R56(Accidental fire or explosion at an onshore major hazard (COMAH) site), R57(Accidental large toxic chemical release from an onshore major hazard (COMAH) site), R75b(Fluvial flooding),	R71(Severe Space Weather), R72(Storms),	R55b(Technological failure at a UK critical financial market infrastructure),
2	R42(Major maritime pollution), R43(Incident (groundingsinking) of a vessel blocking a major port), R45(Aviation collision),	R66(Wildfire), R84(Industrial Action - Firefighters),	R37(Insolvency of supplier(s) of critical services to the public sector), <u>R59(Accidental fire or explosion at an onshore fuel pipeline)</u> , R65(Major Fire), R80d(Major outbreak of African Swine Fever), R81b(Major outbreak of plant pest - Agrilus planipennis), R86(Industrial action - fuel supply),		R29a(Cyber Attack - Government data breach (citizen data)), R39(Failure of a supplier of CNI chemicals),
1	R54(Radiation exposure from transported, stolen or lost goods), R68(Earthquake), R94(0),		R36(Major Social Care Provider Failure),	R44(Accident involving high consequence dangerous goods),	R83(Industrial action - public transport),

Response

Plans

Generic

Major Incident Plan

Multi-Agency Incident Procedures

Function
Specific

Rest Centres, Evacuation, Human
Aspects, Site clearance, Multi-agency
information cell, Mass fatalities, ...

Risk
Specific

Adverse Weather, Flooding, Animal
disease, Maritime pollution, COMAH,
REPPIR, Cyber...

Training and exercising



- No specific statutory requirement for Pipeline Operators to test...
- ...but, expectation
- From the risk register
- Complexity of incidents that may impact pipelines
- How can the LRF demonstrate that the plans have been tested / dovetail into the LRF members plans?
- Coordination of training and exercising remit

Current Working Practice

Cat 2 pipeline operators

- Familiar faces
- Access to training
- Familiar with the SCG / TCG environment

Non-Cat 2 MAHP Pipeline Operators

- ...
- Subsidiarity – duty holder
- Shy bairns get nowt – if it makes sense to have a plan across a wider area (multiple LRFs)

Non-Cat 2 and none MAHP

- Do you have a relationship with agencies / authorities

Changes – UK Government Resilience Framework

- Professionalisation of LRFs
- Cadre of staff / roles
- Consideration ref response role
- Whole Society resilience
- More dynamic risk assessment
- Focus on prevention
- Accountability, Governance and transparency
- Resilience Standards
- Chief Resilience Officers...?
- Pathway from now until 2030, 8 x pilots tbc



UK Resilience Framework

- By 2030- stronger frameworks, systems and capabilities which underpin our resilience to all civil contingencies risks.
- By 2025- pilot across three key pillars of reform
- By 2030- significantly strengthen LRFs in England.



3 Key LRF elements in UK GRF

Stronger democratic accountability

- LRF Leader having the resources, capacity and capability to meet the growing challenges.
- Pilot will test different ways to strengthen LRFs in places with complex democratic arrangements


Stronger LRF Leadership

- Democratic leader (with clear role in ensuring effective delivery of resilience activity)
- LRF Chair evolved into Chief Resilience Officer (full-time resilience professional) and enhanced team

Stronger integration of resilience

- Resilience being a natural part of wider local delivery (and key part of devolution deals)
- Pilot will seek to embed resilience and risk management across all local policy-making and place-making activity

Changing LRF Secretariat resources





CHAPTER 4

ACCII

Accidental fire or explosion at an onshore major accident hazard pipeline


This risk concerns an onshore major accident hazard pipeline (MAHP). These pipelines transport flammable and toxic materials with the potential to cause major accidents if accidentally released. Operators of these pipelines have a legal duty to prevent accidents and to mitigate their consequences. The Health and Safety Executive develops and enforces legislation, standards, codes of practice and guidance to ensure that operators fulfil their responsibilities effectively.

Scenario

The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on an accidental fire or explosion occurring at a MAHP situated close to an urban area. The ignition of flammable gas or liquids under high pressure would result in a loud explosion, which could cause a crater, building damage and require evacuation from homes. The fire may continue to burn until the pipeline is isolated. The fire or explosion would result in casualties and fatalities. Some specialist medical services such as intensive care or burns treatment may be required.

Key assumptions for this scenario

It is assumed that the incident is accidental and would involve a loss of containment, producing a cloud of gas or vapour as well as the results of a fire or explosion. This is likely to result in substantial short-term demands on emergency responders, however this should not continue over an extended period of time as pipelines can be isolated.



- More public info and transparency...
- Scenarios and descriptions in the public domain
- Expectation of assurance
- Manchester Inquiry – LRF Chair and added scrutiny

Future relationship / opportunities between pipeline operators and LRFs?

Risks that may impact on the pipelines – flood, landslips, wildfire etc

Prevention – access to knowledge and resources?

Consider offering multi-LRF exercising / briefings on teams or similar to increase awareness / assurance

Use the LRF / Duty Holder for consultation on plans

Consider engaging with the LRF training and exercising groups

Query if the LRF run familiarisation visits to the local command centres

GIS / CAD files of pipelines

Access to JESIP awareness / similar training to support dovetailing

Handy docs

UK Government Resilience Framework

- <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-government-resilience-framework>

UK Government Risk Register

- <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-risk-register-2023>

LRF Contact Details

- <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/local-resilience-forums-contact-details>

National Resilience Standards

- [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5f4e1107e90e071c6c7d940c/NRS for LRFs V3.0 Aug2020.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5f4e1107e90e071c6c7d940c/NRS_for_LRFs_V3.0_Aug2020.pdf)

National Resilience Forum (link to minutes including membership)

- <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/meeting-notes-for-uk-resilience-forum>