

UKOPA/07/0002

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16/01/07 12:04

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cc

Subject
Changes between Consolidated
Guidance Documents v1.0 and v1.1

This message has been distributed to the contacts that we have for sites within scope.

Regards
David Pascoe
HM Inspector of Health and Safety
HID CI4, Building 4N.2, Redgrave Court
0151 951 4241 VPN 523 4241 Mob 07919 014778

----- Forwarded by David Pascoe/BOOTLE/HSE on 16/01/2007 12:04 -----

David
Pascoe To: ken.rivers@shell.com,
chris.j.hunt@ukpia.com,
richard.clarke@environment-agency.gov.uk,
16/01/2 tony.taylor@exxonmobil.com, Martyn.Lyons@simonstorage.com
007 cc:
12:02 Subject: Changes between Consolidated Guidance
Documents v1.0 and v1.1

All

With respect to the Consolidated Guidance Document v1.1 that was circulated to you, there were some changes made between this document and some of the guidance that had been previously posted on the Group Community Site. In order to assist in version control, documents that are not published in the "Most Recent Documents" section of the site should be considered as having draft status only.

The changes to the guidance documents have been queried and in the interests of transparency, I am detailing here the substantive changes themselves and the reasons for the changes.

1. The changes to the section on pipeline transfers essentially involve a re-ordering of some of the bullet points in order to enhance understanding

- they had become mixed up and open to misintepretation during the re-formatting the report.

2. The changes to the section on valves (ROSOVs) involve:

(a) the deletion of the following sentences:

When the assessment concludes that ROSOVs are required, these should be provided unless it can be demonstrated that the costs of doing so retrospectively are grossly disproportionate to the incremental risk reduction. The reasonable practicability of upgrading these to a type that does fail closed should be assessed. If upgrading to fail-closed valves is not viable, the system should be upgraded to ensure SFAIRP the continued operation of the valve in an emergency (including fire engulfment) for a reasonable period (30 minutes).

This is because these matters are addressed in the HSG244 assessment process itself where reasonable practicability is inherent in the process and these sentences are therefore duplication.

(b) the addition of the line:

These should be upgraded to fail-safe.

This is in order to align this section with the initial recommendation of the Task Group relating to ROSOVs.

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