

Incident Investigation Summary


Responsible Manager: Andrew Fishburn

Incident Reference No: 310676

Incident date: 12 May 2012

During the recommissioning stage of a pipeline NRO, 9 tonnes of gas was discharged via two ½ “ valves at the Partington LNG site over a period of 2 hours as pressure built up to 56 barg.

This Summary is issued to disseminate incident investigation findings and recommendations/ learning for consideration and (as appropriate) action by other operating units, contractors, etc.



What happened.

The NRO to take the pipeline out of service involved operations at two nearby AGI's and at the LNG site. At the LNG site, a 2" valve was left open in error following gas testing.

After the NRO had commenced, the work planned at the LNG site was then cancelled by the project engineer following a HAZCON meeting.

Around two weeks after the work cancellation, it was agreed to proceed with the recommissioning phase of the NRO. As pressure was reintroduced, gas began to discharge through the open valve via two ½-inch valves located on a T piece above. Noise from the leaking gas alerted the LNG Security guard who, on hearing the volume increase over time, called the Partington LNG Compliance Officer.

Also hearing the noise from the nearby Partington AGI, the 2 staff undertaking the recommissioning attended the LNG site. After assessing the leaking pipework arrangement, they decided to isolate the leak by closing the valve on the riser and the leak was stopped.

Why Did This Happen?

At the LNG site, a valve was left open in error following gas testing, but the task and 'closed' valve status was signed for on the NRO.

Had the job proceeded as planned, this error would not have had any consequences, as it was located on pipework that was being removed as part of the NRO. However, due to unresolved contractor competency issues, this removal work was cancelled by the project engineer following a HAZCON meeting.

In the NRO, recommissioning valve checks were detailed at the two AGI's, but as the pipework at the LNG site was being removed as part of the NRO, there were no recommissioning valve checks to be done here. The impact of cancellation of the removal work on the recommissioning stage of the NRO was not fully assessed.

Learning points.

Ensure a clear segregation of duties between the person carrying out an isolation and the competent person checking that the isolation has taken place.

The NRO Procedure is a systematic method statement and each step should be separately signed to confirm it has been completed satisfactorily.

HAZCON meetings should be concluded prior to NRO commencement, minimising the likelihood of late changes.

If the programmed work does not go ahead as planned, this may have an impact on subsequent stages of the NRO. The NRO must not proceed further until the impact of the change is fully assessed in conjunction with the NRO author.

Circulation: Gas Transmission, Gas Distribution
Issue Date: November 2012

Review Date: November 2013

For further information regarding this bulletin please contact your Line Manager or Rob Stockley on 07866488892.