

**Safety Alert No: Jan 01**

**Subject:** Fire on-board Hummingbird FPSO EV 162913

**Platform/Site/Area:** Hummingbird FPSO UKNS

**Date of Incident:** 27<sup>th</sup> December 2013

**Issued by:** Robert Millman, HSE Advisor Operated Assets UK/NL

**Reviewed by:** Khary Fermin, Safety Manager/ UKNS HSE Team lead (Ag.) 08/01/14

**Approved by:** Ewan Hamilton, HSE Function Manager/ UKNS Head HSE (Ag.) 08/01/14

**No of Pages:** 2

**Details of Incident:**


A single flame detector activated in the control room. A production operator was sent to investigate and confirmed that smoke was coming from the general waste skip on the stores lay down area.

At the time of the incident, there was an offload taking place to the shuttle tanker, Gijon Knutsen. The offload operation was immediately ceased as soon as the general platform alarm was activated, with disconnection of the tanker taking place once the incident had been remedied and the area confirmed safe.

**Additional factors:**

Both diesel generators (“DGs”) were being run simultaneously in addition to an OPRA turbine due to the offload power requirements. Under normal circumstances, 2 OPRA turbines would be operating with a DG on under light load as a backup. As only one OPRA turbine was operating, the 2 x DGs were operating at higher loads / exhaust temperatures than normal.

It appears that the scaffolding board adjacent to or in direct contact with the exhaust of the first DG started to smoulder, causing hot embers to be blown into the general waste skip, which then caught fire.



Scaffolding boards and DG exhausts in-situ.



Close-up of charred scaffolding boards



View from above skip with fire damage visible.

**Recommendations or required actions:**

A joint CE E+P / WG investigation is underway.

The recommendations/findings from the Wood Group Initial Incident Report were as follows:

1. Scaffolding boards should be removed from the structure around the exhausts, leaving only the boards adjacent to the walkway on the deck level (heat protection to personnel);
2. General waste, and soft plastic skips should be relocated from their current location;
3. The damaged light fitting should be isolated, until replaced, and cables should be checked for damage;
4. The DGs should be tested to ensure exhaust integrity within the DG room, following the exhausts being exposed to higher running temperatures; and
5. Both DG exhausts should be replaced with new units as soon as possible.

The first four recommendations from the Wood Group Initial Incident Report have since been actioned and are now complete. Action 5 is pending.

It is further recommended by CE E+P that Operations teams should ensure that scaffold boards or other combustible materials are not placed in direct contact with a heat source.

**For further information:**

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**NOTE: All Safety Alerts must be approved by CEE&P Legal prior to release.**

**CEE&P Legal: Julie Hardie**

**Date: 09/01/14**