UKOPA

United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators' Association

Good Practice Guide

Major Accident Hazard Pipeline Emergency Response Plan: Testing and Exercising Pro-forma

UKOPA/GPG/012 Ed 2

October 2024

GUIDANCE ISSUED BY UKOPA:

The guidance in this document represents what is considered by UKOPA to represent current UK pipeline industry good practice within the defined scope of the document. All requirements should be considered guidance and should not be considered obligatory against the judgement of the Pipeline Owner/Operator. Where new and better techniques are developed and proved, they should be adopted without waiting for modifications to the guidance in this document

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Revision and change control history

Planned revision: 2029

Edition	Date	No. of pages	Summary of changes
0	January 2011		First published as UKOPA-11-036
1	September 2016	21	Revised to UKOPA/GPG/012 Ed 1 (updated to Good Practice Guide format with minor editorial changes – no material changes)
2	October 2024	30	Planned review, updated references and general editorial

CONTENTS

1   INTRODUCTION

The Pipelines Safety Regulations (PSR) 1996 currently places a duty on Local Authorities to prepare emergency plans for Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHP). This document has been produced by UKOPA to provide guidance to parties involved in the testing of emergency plans for MAHP.

Under the PSR, there is currently no requirement for testing and exercising pipeline emergency plans by Local Authorities. However, it is recognised that the testing and exercising of such plans are beneficial and allow appropriate evaluation and scheduling of such exercises to take place within individual companies. Should an emergency plan test be undertaken this document provides a template that can be completed to evidence that the test was adequate and that all appropriate aspects of the plan have been suitably tested. It can also be used to identify where remedial actions may need to be taken to address any shortcomings in the plan that have been found through the testing of the emergency plan.

This document should be used in conjunction with the UKOPA good practice guides

- Major Accident Hazard Pipeline Emergency Response Plans: Guidance on Testing (UKOPA/GPG/010)

- Major Accident Hazard Pipeline Emergency Response Plans: Emergency Plan Template (UKOPA/GPG/011)

2   SCOPE AND APPLICATION

2.1   Scope

The guidance in this document is applicable to all pipelines operated by UKOPA members that are classified under the PSR as MAHP. The guidance is also generally applicable to other non-MAHP pipelines operated by the UKOPA member companies although it should be noted that there is not currently a legal requirement to develop emergency plans for these pipelines. It should be noted however that products harmful to the environment should have environmental response plans in place, and would follow the good practice demonstrated within the documents.

2.2   Application

As stated in Section 1 above, under the PSR there is currently no requirement for testing and exercising pipeline emergency plans. However, it is recognised that the testing and exercising of such plans are beneficial and allow appropriate evaluation, revision, and improvement.

The guidance in this document represents what is considered by UKOPA to represent current UK pipeline industry good practice within the defined scope of the document. All requirements should be considered guidance and should not be considered obligatory against the judgement of the Pipeline Owner/Operator. Where new and better techniques are developed and proved, they should be adopted without waiting for modifications to the guidance in this document.

The key objectives of any test are:

- To validate the pipeline emergency plan.

- Test characteristics particular to pipelines.

- Provide learning opportunities.

- Ensure the response of pipeline operators, emergency services and other key partners dovetails under the Local Authority plan.

- Ensure that programmes, decisions, and actions raised in testing pipeline emergency plans are auditable

3   EXERCISE TYPES

Various methods can be applied to the testing of pipeline emergency plans:

3.1   Communication Exercises

Communication exercises test the essential direct links, contact numbers and contact details which are required in the event of an emergency.

Communication exercises in which the direct communications links (methods) and contacts between key stakeholders are tested to confirm accuracy and reliability are an essential requirement..

3.2   Control Post Exercising

Control post exercising is the recommended method for testing communications, which is an essential component of the emergency plan and should be included in every test programme.

A control post communication exercise examines the adequacy of communications between all key players in an emergency. Testing in this way involves resources based at the posts and locations that they would assume in the event of an accident. This means that without deploying any resources, personnel work through the communications involved in the roles, decisions and actions that arise in response to an accident. The exercise may include simulating some of the potential problems that can be experienced during real incidents e.g. mobile black spots, or system overloads.

This type of exercise should identify the use of generic phone numbers, or discarded numbers. During plan activation being held in switchboards or "gatehouse" numbers slows and frustrates the efforts of responders and should be eliminated during such tests.

3.3   Table Top Exercises

Tabletop exercises are based on simulation, not necessarily literally around a table top. Tabletop exercises bring together the appropriate personnel and resources in one place to work through their roles in the event of an emergency in a realistic way. Tabletop exercises are flexible and can test the response to more than one of the identified hazards involving realistic scenarios and a time line, which may be real time or may speed time up, they can be conducted.

By using this method, time outs can be easily incorporated to the day, which can offer essential time to stop, reflect and move on, or to simply move the scenario along in sensible manner. The round table approach brings together all the required personnel to one place, which aids the development of the relationships between all participants.

Utilising this approach, multiple local authorities and pipeline operators can participate in generic scenarios which give an opportunity for as many stakeholders as possible to understand the differences (and similarities) when dealing with differing authorities, operators, and product pipelines.

This type of exercise is particularly useful for validation purposes, particularly for exploring weaknesses in procedures. Table-top exercises are relatively cheap to run, except in the use of staff time. They demand careful preparation.

3.4 Seminar, Workshop or Discussion Based Tests

These test exercises are aimed at informing participants about the organisation and procedures which would be invoked in response to an incident. This approach can be used to provide information on current developments, and generally focus on particular aspects of response to an accident. Whilst this may not be classed as an exercise this would encompass the requirements to develop depth of understanding so that plans can be relied upon to work effectively in an emergency.

When working in this environment employing a "red team" to challenge each action in may be beneficial in developing understanding of actions of all decisions made from the plan.

3.5 Live Exercises

Live exercises involve the deployment of appropriate resources in a simulation of their actual response to an accident scenario selected from the identified hazards. Live exercises are expensive to set up on the day and demand the most extensive preparation..

Live exercises are a live rehearsal for implementing a plan. Such exercises are particularly useful for testing logistics, communications and physical capabilities.

Pipelines are often buried and invisible, developing credible scenarios for live play response will require sufficient space to understand the impacts of pipeline failure modes, therefore working on a pipeline is not necessarily the right place to play the scenario (why introduce risk to a MAHP?). There will also be a significant response to such a scenario therefore welfare and coordination of participants should be carefully considered

3.6 Other Methods of Exercising

These test exercises

- Internet-based Communications Software,

- Information Technology, or

- Virtual Reality Systems.

These systems allow realistic simulations of accidents and the response to them. Such systems have the potential to enable effective and practical testing, and to enhance the scope of the exercise by adding realistic visualisations.

4   EXERCISE CONSIDERATIONS

Where possible or achievable, 'joint Operator' exercises should be considered to address joint elements of a plan. The Exercise Planning Group should determine which specific agency elements are to be tested at each exercise.

Tabletop testing is considered to be a relevant and effective means of testing emergency plans, and is the recommended method for testing of pipeline emergency plans.

5   CONSIDERATION CRITERIA FOR EXERCISE MANAGEMENT

The Local Authority should be the lead agency for issues associated with exercise co-ordination. The MAHP exercises are to test some or all elements of the plan using one of the identified workplace scenarios.

Each exercise should have an 'Exercise Director', as determined by the Planning Group, to ensure elements of reality are retained within the exercise.

Any exercise, by an agency or Operator, should include a representative of such agency. A specific agency role must not be 'played' by anyone other than a member of that agency.

6   EXERCISE PLANNING AND DEBRIEF PROTOCOLS

6.1   General Considerations

- Exercise planning meetings should involve all agencies, unless apologies are given, or no attendance is required.

- The Senior Emergency Planning Officer (Local Authority) should Chair meetings on a formal basis, outlining the reasons for the meeting and ensuring the meeting follows the format outlined in this document.

- The Chair of the meeting should issue an 'agenda' prior to each meeting.

- All attendees should identify themselves and state their role.

- Planning meetings must incorporate a consideration of the aims and objectives of the exercise for each agency.

- All agency planners should keep written records of exercise planning.

- A bank of questions for use in the debrief process should be drawn up by the Emergency Planning Officers from the Emergency Services and Local Authorities.

- The exercise abort code should always be agreed in advance. This is typically "Exercise (name) NO DUFF" to maintain consistency of approach.

- Dates / Times of subsequent meetings to be agreed.

6.2   1st Exercise Planning Meeting

- The Chair of the meeting should issue an agenda prior to the meeting.

- The Operator should be included in discussions in the outlining of the scenario(s) for consideration.

- Agree the aims and objectives of the exercise.

- Agree the aims and objectives of each organisation.

- Determine which elements of the off-site plan are to be tested.

- Agree the author of the exercise script and/or members of the 'script team'.

- Agree exercise dynamics i.e. acknowledging that to achieve the aims and objectives of the exercise, certain artificialities will need to occur that should not happen in a 'real' incident.

- Agree outline of scenario, including location and exercise name.

- Agree who should be the Exercise Controller and Exercise Director(s).

- Discuss numbers and locations of Umpires.

- Discuss numbers and locations of Observers.

- Agree dates and times for key milestones (the exercise date).

- Discuss date(s) for debriefs.

6.3 2nd Exercise Planning Meeting

- The Chair of the meeting should issue an agenda prior to the meeting.

- Consolidate all matters discussed at the first meeting, agreeing amendments as appropriate.

- Emergency Services and Local Authority should provide the Site Operator with estimated cost of their involvement in the exercise.

- Conduct Health and Safety and risk assessment 'walk through' – alternatively arrange a separate date/time for this to occur.

- Agree dates for debrief(s).

- Agree who should be the debrief leader.

- Agree who the debrief attendees should be (key players).

- Agree which players, observers etc. can be debriefed through a questionnaire process, instead of them attending the formal exercise debrief.

- If possible, set date for post exercise meeting.

- Agree which Emergency Service and industry personnel should attend the 'hot debrief' or alternatively complete a 'hot debrief' proforma that asks persons to identify positive and negative issues encountered during the exercise.

6.4 The Exercise

- All Umpires and Observers should be in their agreed positions prior to commencement of the exercise.

- Appropriate staff not directly involved in the exercise should be briefed e.g. gate/security staff.

- The Exercise Director should ensure that Umpires are aware of their role and be aware of the abort code word.

- The Exercise Controller and Director(s) should have radio or telephone communication between themselves and all Umpires where site conditions allow.

- The Exercise Controller should be the person to authorise the aborting of the exercise, although in extreme circumstances the Exercise Director(s) or an Umpire may do so.

6.5 'Hot Debrief'

- Wherever possible, the key players should be brought together immediately following the exercise and asked to give initial comments on one or two positive and negative aspects of the exercise.

- The 'hot debrief' should be facilitated by a non-industrial member of the planning team.

- It should seek to identify issues that require immediate attention.

- Alternatively, persons involved in the exercise can complete a questionnaire seeking responses to questions that should form the basis of the later structured debrief.

- Data should be collated from the responses and fed into the later structured debrief and can be used as evidence in the production of the draft testing and exercising matrix.

6.6 Exercise Debrief(s) and Report

- Debriefing should be of a structured nature and consistent wherever possible to ensure accurate constructive information from exercises is recorded.

- To assist in the recording of information and provide evidence for the debrief report, an assistant to the Debrief Leader should take notes of the debrief process, especially of the sharing and discussion phase.

- All agency personnel, as agreed at the 2nd Exercise Planning Meeting, wherever possible, should be involved in the debrief.

- If a particular person or persons raise significant issues during the debrief, the Debrief Leader should see them afterwards to clarify issues raised.

- Debrief Questionnaires should be used for 'identified' staff not involved in the actual structured debrief.

- Findings from the questionnaire should form part of the final structured debrief report.

- The Debrief Leader/facilitator should produce a draft report within 10 days of the last debrief being held.

- The draft debrief report should be forwarded to the Local Authority Emergency Planning Officer immediately upon completion to allow him/her to enter those findings onto a draft copy of the exercising and testing matrix for that site.

- The draft Debrief Report should be forwarded to the Site Operator and each participating agency.

- At debrief, set date for post exercise meeting, if not already agreed.

- The Debrief Report is then reviewed by the Exercise Planning Group, the significant outcomes and actions listed in a report document and actions given to members to address.

7   TESTING AND EXERCISING MATRIX

- The Local Authority Emergency Planning Officer should prepare a draft matrix based upon evidence gained from:

- Notes taken at the 'hot debrief' or data gained from questionnaires issued immediately after the exercise.

- The debrief report.

- Notes taken during the debrief.

- Questionnaires completed by those who did not attend the structured debrief.

- Reports from Umpires and Observers.

- His/her own observations.

- The draft matrix should be completed within 10 working days of receiving all the reports and debrief report.

- The draft matrix should be sent to the Site Operator and participating agencies, particularly the Emergency Services.

- An example matrix is given in Section 11.

8   POST EXERCISE MEETINGS

- If urgent action to an issue was identified in the exercise or in the debrief process, the organisation / agency responsible for rectifying that issue should bring to this meeting details of action taken or being taken, and dates that actions are to be completed by.

- The meeting should involve the Local Authority Emergency Planning Officer, Emergency Services' Planning Officers, representative(s) of the Site Operator and other agencies were requested or deemed necessary.

- Discuss, amend and consolidate the draft testing and exercising matrix.

- Agree the actions and recommendations that arose from the exercise and debrief process, taking into consideration the actions of the Exercise Planning Group to the outcomes from the debrief.

- Each agency to identify possible improvements in their own plan as well as other agency plans.

- Agree action plan, with timescales, detailing the organisation/agency that should take 'ownership' of each action point.

- All persons present to be realistic in their comments and to be positive, not negative – providing or suggesting a solution or way forward where possible.

- Set date for post exercise conclusion meeting.

9 POST EXERCISE CONCLUSION MEETING

- The Meeting should follow up on actions agreed at the Post Exercise Meeting to determine if actions have been achieved / recommendations acted upon.

- Agree amendments to the testing and exercising matrix to show actions that have been achieved and/or recommendations acted upon.

- If necessary, agree new timescales for implementations of actions or amend actions in light of new evidence / information or developments to the plan.

10 UK RESILIENCE EXERCISE GUIDANCE

Further information on exercises is available at:

https://www.gov.uk/emergency-planning-and-preparedness-exercises-and-training

https://www.gov.uk/guidance/preparation-and-planning-for-emergencies-responsibilities-of-responder-agencies-and-others

https://www.gov.uk/browse/citizenship/government/emergencies-preparation-response-and-recovery

http://www.readyscotland.org/media/1129/rs-rg-preparing-scotland-exercise-guidance.pdf

Other useful information can be found at:

http://www.jesip.org.uk/home

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-preparedness

https://www.gov.uk/guidance/emergency-response-and-recovery

https://www.epcresilience.com/knowledge-hub/guidance

11 PROFORMA TEMPLATE / AIDE MEMOIRE

	Elements of plan	Evidence requirements
1.1	Plan written; reviewed or updated	Dates and by whom
1.2	Plans located	Details of where plans kept e.g. Police/Fire Control Rooms, Emergency Planning Unit (EPU) etc. Operator
1.3	Provision of maps/revised	If provided by company Type of maps Location of maps
1.4	Technical information	Data sheet, (size, pressure, hazard zone, product, etc.)

	Activation of Plan and actions by Operator (including PERO) should an incident occur	Evidence requirements
2.1	Initiation of plan	How is it completed e.g. Operator, direct phone to EMERGENCY services. Who does it (name/position). Is it in their roles and responsibilities?
2.2	Notification to Emergency Services	How – 999 or direct line or other means Did it work – if not, why not Is there a person with this identified role – If so, who and are they aware. Any PPE requirements clearly communicated to the Emergency Services
2.3	Setting up Major Emergency Control Centre (MECC)	Location Are there sufficient phones, faxes, computers, desks, white boards Did equipment work Is MECC easily accessible (out of hours – location of keys) Availability and location of plans, aide memoirs, hazard data

	Activation of Plan and actions by Operator (including PERO) should an incident occur	Evidence requirements
		Was it set up in a timely manner
2.4	Alerting and calling out of staff	Names, positions, contact numbers Is list correct Could staff be contacted Date of last 'ring round'
2.5	Provision of fall back MECC	Does one exist? If so, location Same evidence as 2.4 above
2.6	Key staff in MECC	Who – their roles – did they understand their roles and responsibilities Did they arrive in MECC – time factor
2.7	Off-site communications (Links to external agencies, neighbours, etc.)	By what means – phone, fax, pager, e-mail Did they work Details available on identified contacts Was someone designated to perform this task
2.8	Notification to Competent Authority	Were correct contact details held / known Was it performed and by whom
2.9	Warning and informing the public	Has the Operator a strategy/protocol to warn and inform the public Was it enacted By what means – fax, telephone, public address system, social media, etc. Who does it e.g. public relations officer, etc. Was information disseminated in a timely manner Was content sufficient to enable public to understand what action was necessary Amongst senior managers, is there an awareness of any strategy Are staff aware of their roles and responsibilities under the strategy Was warning / information repeated – how often

	Activation of Plan and actions by Operator (including PERO) should an incident occur	Evidence requirements
2.10	Dynamic risk assessment of consequences	Was one conducted Who by Was it timely – was it revisited What was taken into consideration – e.g. chemical concerned, wind speed and direction, amount released, toxicity, harmful effects, environmental impact if any, density of population likely to be affected, knowledge of vulnerable premises, how quickly could plant be stabilised, isolations completed, warnings necessary for public, etc.

	Command and Control, including the Major Emergency Centre (MECC)	Evidence requirements
3.1	Communication Systems	Adequate number of phones for Operator personnel Phones available in MECC for emergency services Phones available for use by Local Authority staff Adequate number of electronic devices (e.g. PCs, tablets, etc.) Fax machine present System – was it adequate for both internal and external communications. Internal/external telephone directory available Directory – up to date Did staff know how to work the communications system, incl. fax
3.2	Continual Liaison, including briefing procedures / 'time outs'	Was an MECC Room Manager or equivalent appointed?

	Command and Control, including the Major Emergency Centre (MECC)	Evidence requirements
		Was a person designated to meet/greet/brief persons as they arrived in MECC?
		Were Liaison Officers from Emergency Services briefed upon arrival at MECC?
		Did 'time outs' take place – were they well conducted / concise / constructive / informative – did they create actions or just a 'talking shop'.
		Were actions followed through
3.3	Availability / accuracy of site plans / maps	Were maps / plans available?
		Were maps / plans laminated so plume, location of Forward Command Point (FCP), etc. could be drawn/written thereon?
		Did map cover surrounding area so potential off-site consequences could be plotted, PIZ (Public Information Zone) shown, domino sites identifiable.
		Was compass point 'north' shown on map
3.4	Technical information	Was a Technical advisor part of MECC Team?
		Was he/she present – part of call-out team
		Was there technical information readily available – either PC or paper based
		How easy was technical information available and disseminated
		Was technical information conveyed to emergency services and others in language they could understand?
3.5	Sharing and dissemination of information	How good was the process of sharing information
		Was information shared amongst others, e.g. Emergency Services, Site Incident Controller, Local Authority, neighbours, media

	Command and Control, including the Major Emergency Centre (MECC)	Evidence requirements
		Was salient information 'posted' on wall boards
3.6	Response	Was response by Operator positive
		Was major incident plan activated
		Was response timely
		Did response cover effects, implications, etc.?– what and by whom
		Did staff know their roles and responsibilities
		Did staff know of and understand the roles and responsibilities of others, including external agencies and emergency services
		Were they aware of the MAHP plan(s) – location / content?
		Were they aware of worst case scenarios
3.7	Incident Log	In what form was the log of events kept
		Were strategic decisions recorded
		Was there a dedicated person performing this role
		Was it kept up to date
		Was the 'loggist' kept informed of events/decisions to enable them to log them appropriately
		Was log available for Emergency Services Commanders to check
		Were salient points highlighted in log
		Were salient points/important decisions made, put on board elsewhere in MECC so persons present were aware of them

	Command and Control, including the Major Emergency Centre (MECC)	**Evidence requirements**
3.8	Links with Forward Control	Type of links between MECC and FCP Did links work effectively / were they sufficient Was a dedicated person appointed to perform this linkage
3.9	Mitigation action(s) to reduce off-site consequences / impact on off-site arrangements	Were implications/effects (or potential) considered If so, were they sufficient / timely / adequate Provide examples/evidence of important action
3.10	Mitigation action(s) to reduce any adverse effects to the environment	Were implications / effects (or potential) considered If so, were they sufficient / timely / adequate Involvement of external environmental 'experts' Involvement of Environment Agency / Local Authority EHO's Use of / consideration of an Environmental Impact Analysis Group (EIAG) EIAG – set up / roles / responsibilities / knowledge

	On-Site Control	Evidence requirements
4.1	Links to MECC / External Agency(ies)	Type of links Did they work / were they adequate Were there sufficient personnel to provide appropriate information link
4.2	Provision of information to MECC / Emergency Services	Did Site Incident Controller (SIC) provide information to MECC / Emergency Services Was it adequate / appropriate / timely Was SIC aware of facts to be able to give proper information to those requiring it Was information regularly updated Did 'time outs' occur Were Emergency Services or others at FCP briefed appropriately
4.3	Technical Information	Did SIC have appropriate technical knowledge Was a Technical Officer (or person with that knowledge) at FCP Did SIC have access to a Technical Officer Was technical information available either in written form or PC based e.g. chemical data sheets
4.4	Liaison with Emergency Services	Were Emergency Services properly briefed on arrival at FCP Was there easy access to the SIC for the Emergency Services Were Emergency Services part of 'time out' procedures Was specialist or technical information available to the Emergency Services

	Response by Agencies	Evidence requirements
5.1	Activation of and Response by Police	Activation – how / who by
		Police checklist of persons/agencies to inform – completed
		Police aware of site location and access
		Was a safe route established
		Were RV points considered / set up
		Was wind speed and direction obtained
		Was ChemData obtained
		Actions by Bronze Commander
		Actions by First Officer at scene
		Actions by Silver Commander
		Police Liaison Officer to / in MECC
		Actions by Gold Commander, if utilised
		Was response timely
		Were there sufficient officers available / deployed to deal with incident
		Were road closures / diversionary routes considered / established / effective
		Were officers aware of their roles and responsibilities
		Did Police discharge their responsibilities in line with their emergency procedures
		Were Police communications effective
		Was a Casualty Bureau established – was it effective
		Was there good liaison and lines of communication between the Police and other emergency services
		Was there good liaison and lines of communication between the Police and other agencies i.e. Local

	Response by Agencies	Evidence requirements
		Authority, Emergency Planning Unit
		Did the Police co-ordinate the media – was it effective
		Evacuation – considered / implemented / effective
		Were body handling / recovery procedures exercised - effective
		Were scenes of crime procedures effective
		Prevention of people entering the affected area
		Operator access routes
5.2	Activation of and Response by Fire and Rescue Service	Activation – how / who by
		FRS checklist of persons/agencies to inform – completed
		FRS aware of site location and access
		Was a safe route established
		Were RV points considered / set up
		Was wind speed and direction obtained
		Was ChemData available / obtained
		Actions by Bronze Commander (Operation)
		Actions by Silver Commander (Tactical)
		FRS Liaison Officer to / in MECC
		Actions by 'Gold' Commander, (Strategic) if utilised
		Was response timely
		Were there sufficient officers / appliances available and/or deployed to deal with incident

	Response by Agencies	Evidence requirements
		Were officers aware of their roles and responsibilities
		Did FRS discharge their responsibilities in line with their emergency procedures
		Were FRS communications effective
		Was a FCP established - was it effective
		Was an inner / outer cordon established
		Was PPE used / effective
		Was there good liaison and lines of communication between the FRS and other emergency services
		Was there good liaison and lines of communication between the Fire Brigade and other agencies i.e. Local Authority, Emergency Planning Unit
		Was foam needed to fight the incident – was there sufficient available
		Were de-contamination procedures exercised - effective
		Were media protocols observed
		Was there containment of fire water 'runoff'
5.3	Activation of and Response by Ambulance	Activation – how / who by
		Ambulance checklist of persons/agencies to inform – completed
		Were Ambulance aware of site location and access
		Was safe route established
		Were RV points considered / set up
		Was wind speed and direction obtained
		Was ChemData obtained
		Actions by first ambulances on scene

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	Response by Agencies	Evidence requirements
		Was an Ambulance Incident Officer dispatched – was their role effective
		Was a medical control point and tri-age area established
		Were ambulance loading points/casualty clearing stations established
		Was response timely
		Were there sufficient officers available / deployed to deal with incident
		Was an Ambulance Liaison Officer dispatched to receiving hospital
		Did Ambulance Control inform the receiving hospital(s)
		Were officers aware of their roles and responsibilities
		Did the Ambulance Service discharge their responsibilities in line with their emergency procedures
		Were Ambulance communications effective
		Was there good liaison and lines of communication between the Ambulance Service and other Emergency Services
		Was there good liaison and lines of communication between the Ambulance Service and other agencies i.e. Local Authority, Emergency Planning Unit
		Was a mobile medical team considered / exercised / was it available
		Decontamination procedures
		Did Ambulance Service obtain correct information on chemical to effectively deal with casualties

	Response by Agencies	Evidence requirements
5.4	Activation of and Response by Local Authority	How were they alerted
		Was alerting timely
		Was Emergency Planning Duty Officer alerted – responded
		Was Local Authority Emergency Centre established – was it effective
		Was a Local Authority Liaison Officer sent to MECC / Police Command (Silver and/or Gold) – were they aware of their role and responsibilities
		Were Rest Centres / Reception Centres – considered / effective
		Was Local Authority able to respond to requests to effect road closures / traffic diversions
		Were their viable plans for emergency accommodation and feeding
		Dissemination of warnings / information to local authority vulnerable premises in area of incident
		Was Chief Executive and Chief Officers alerted – timely / available
		Did Local Authority media staff work alongside Police in co-ordinating media response
		Did Local Authority provide specialist advice e.g. environmental / public health
		Co-ordination of recovery phase
		Were there viable plans for removal of rubbish / large amounts of debris
		Were there viable plans for provision of temporary or permanent housing of persons made homeless
		Were there viable plans to safeguard the public against environmental conditions prejudicial to public health
		Were there procedures in place to inform elected members
		Were MAHP plans readily available

	Response by Agencies	Evidence requirements
5.5	Activation of and Response by Harbour Authority	Alerted, if appropriate
		Was it timely
		Were their contact procedures effective
		Were actions taken to safeguard ships and their crews
		Were marine pollution procedures enacted i.e. deployment of booms, skimmers to retrieve surface material, etc.
		Were they kept informed of the incident as it progressed
5.6	Activation of and Response by Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)	Alerted, if appropriate
		Was it timely
		Were their contact procedures effective
		Were procedures enacted
5.7	Activation of and Response by Primary Care Trust (PCT)	Were they alerted – was it timely
		Were the PCT's contact / alerting procedures effective
		Were the PCT's links with the receiving hospitals robust
		Were their emergency procedures effective
5.8	Activation of and Response by Health Protection Agency (HPA)	Were they alerted – was it timely
		Were their contact / alerting procedures effective
		Were their links with the receiving hospitals robust
		Were their emergency procedures effective

	Response by Agencies	Evidence requirements
		Did they provide specialist advice i.e. contagious diseases
5.9	Activation of and Response by Hospital(s)	Were they alerted by the Ambulance Control
		Was the alerting timely
		Were their contact / alerting procedures effective
		Were their links with the ambulance control robust
		Were their emergency procedures effective
		Was a Hospital Control Team deployed – effective
		Did they have the expertise to deal with the chemicals involved
5.10	Activation of and Response by Environment Agency	Were they alerted – by whom – was it timely
		Was specialist environmental advice offered / provided to assist with mitigation actions
		Did an Environment Agency (EA) competent officer respond
		Was the EA regularly updated
		Were they involved in the Environmental Impact Analysis Group
		Did a competent officer respond i.e. member of DEFRA Rural Team
		Was the DEFRA regularly updated
5.11	Activation of and Response by Health & Safety Executive	Were they alerted – by whom – was it timely
		Was specialist advice offered / provided to assist the Operator mitigation actions
		Did an HSE Inspector respond
		Was the HSE regularly updated

	Issues to be considered during response:	
6.1	Rendezvous Points	Were suggested RV points identified in plans
		Were responding Emergency Services aware of them
		Were the RV points utilised effectively
		Was an RV Officer(s) appointed by Police or other Emergency Service
6.2	Safe Routes	Were suggested safe routes identified in plan, taking into account normal wind direction
		Were the responding Emergency Services aware of them
		Before personnel / vehicles were sent to the scene, were safe routes:
		considered
		determined
		was advice sought from Operator
		plume, wind speed and direction obtained by each Emergency Service / Local Authority (or information shared)
6.3	Road closures / traffic management	Were suggested road closures identified in plan
		Were road closures considered during exercise
		Would they have been effective or completed in a timely manner
		Were alternative routes considered
		Was the LA Traffic Management Section contacted / timely manner
		Would Traffic Management have been able to put diversionary routes into effect
		Had diversionary routes been considered prior to exercise
		Did LA have appropriate barriers / signage to effect road closures / diversions considered during exercise

	Communications:	
6.4	Activation of supporting procedures e.g. media	Were media protocols activated – timely – who by Effectiveness of a media briefing centre Were press statements produced – who by – were they timely – were they co-ordinated Was there a regular liaison of Public Relation Officers (PRO's) between Operator and Police or other lead agencies Was a lead PRO designated (who?) and publicised?
6.5	Between Emergency Services and Operator	Were effective communication links established Were Liaison Officers exchanged to aid flow of information
6.6	Between Emergency Services	Were effective communication links established – maintained
6.7	Between Emergency Services, Local Authorities and other Agency(ies)	Were effective communication links established - maintained
6.8	Between Emergency Services, Control Rooms and Forward Control Post	Were effective communication links established - maintained

	Good Practice	Evidence requirements
7.1	Company de-brief following exercise / test	Dates Attendance sheet Minutes / outcomes Action sheet if necessary
7.2	Multi agency debrief following exercise / test	Date(s) Report and Attendance Sheet Minutes of 'follow up' meeting Action sheet if necessary
7.3	**Police**	Dates and by whom Include tour of site/MECC and presentation of Operators response arrangements
	Fire	Dates and by whom Include tour of site/MECC and presentation of Operators response arrangements
	Ambulance	Dates and by whom Include tour of site/MECC and presentation of Operators response arrangements
	Emergency Planning Unit / Local Authority	Dates and by whom Where appropriate, Elected Members for the Council Ward in which the site is situated should attend Include tour of site/MECC and presentation of Operators response arrangements