UKOPA

United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators' Association

Good Practice Guide

Major Accident Hazard Pipeline Emergency Response Plan Template

UKOPA/GPG/011 Ed 2

October 2024

GUIDANCE ISSUED BY UKOPA:

The guidance in this document represents what is considered by UKOPA to represent current UK pipeline industry good practice within the defined scope of the document. All requirements should be considered guidance and should not be considered obligatory against the judgement of the Pipeline Owner/Operator. Where new and better techniques are developed and proved, they should be adopted without waiting for modifications to the guidance in this document

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Revision and change control history

Planned revision: 2029

Edition	Date	No. of pages	Summary of changes
0	January 2011		First published as UKOPA-11-036
1	September 2017	35	Revised to UKOPA/GPG/011 Ed 1 (updated to Good Practice Guide format with minor editorial changes – no material changes)
2	October 2024	34	Planned review and update to accommodate JESIP principles and off-site command structures

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

The Pipelines Safety Regulations (PSR) 1996 currently place a duty on pipeline operators to have emergency procedures in place (Regulation 24) and Local Authorities to prepare emergency plans for Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHP) (Regulation 25). This document has been produced by UKOPA to provide guidance to Local Authorities in developing their MAHP specific emergency plans.

This document should be used in conjunction with the UKOPA good practice guides.

- Major Accident Hazard Pipeline Emergency Response Plans, Guidance on Testing (UKOPA/GPG/010)
- Major Accident Hazard Pipeline Emergency Response Plans, Testing and Exercising Pro-forma (UKOPA/GPG/012)

2 SCOPE AND APPLICATION

2.1 Scope

The guidance in this document is applicable to all pipelines operated by UKOPA members that are classified under the PSR as MAHP. The guidance is also generally applicable to other non-MAHP pipelines operated by the UKOPA member companies although it should be noted that there is not currently a legal requirement to develop emergency plans for these pipelines although arrangements must be in place to respond to pipeline failures and loss of containment. It should be noted however that products harmful to the environment should have environmental response plans in place and would follow the good practice demonstrated within the documents.

Regulation 3 of the PSR defines the meaning of 'pipeline'. An emergency plan has to apply to all parts of a MAHP, not just the buried pipe sections. For example, natural gas pipelines will include block valve sites, offtakes, pressure reduction stations and compressor stations etc. However, sites used for storage and gas terminals are not part of the pipeline.

2.2 Application

The purpose of a Local Authority emergency plan is to ensure that the response of all key stakeholders to an accident protects the public and is co-ordinated with the aim of working together, saving lives, reducing harm. It is critical that pipeline operator emergency arrangements and procedures and Local Authority emergency plans dovetail to provide a comprehensive and effective response to emergencies.

Emergency plans are required to provide an additional safeguard so that, in the unlikely event of an emergency involving a MAHP, protection could be provided to members of the public whose health and safety might be affected.

The HSE have defined the aim of an emergency plan as.

> *"To detail action to be taken to minimise the consequences to the health and safety of people in the event of an emergency involving a major accident hazard pipeline."*

The guidance in this document represents what is considered by UKOPA to represent current UK pipeline industry good practice within the defined scope of the document. All requirements should be considered to be guidance and should not be considered to be obligatory against the judgement of the Pipeline Owner/Operator. Where new and better techniques are developed and proved, they should be adopted without waiting for modifications to the guidance in this document.

3 EMERGENCY PLAN TEMPLATE

The following document Annex – Emergency Plan Template is provided to be used by Local Authorities when developing their MAHP specific emergency plans. By using this template Local Authorities can be confident that their emergency plan is adequate as defined in Regulation 25 of the Pipelines Safety Regulations and meets the requirements of the supporting guidance of this Regulation with respect to the required contents of a MAHP emergency plan. However Local Authorities need to be aware that there are additional requirements in Regulation 25 that need to be complied with such as co-operation with relevant third party organisations and updating the emergency plan.

The Annex to this document can be requested in word format to enable Local Authorities to produce their plan in line with the guidance outlined.

To request a copy please email secretary@UKOPA.co.uk and include 'UKOPA/GPG/011 Emergency Plan Template' in the header.

3.1 Purpose of the Plan

The purpose of a local authority emergency plan is to ensure that the response of all key stakeholders to an accident protects the public and is co-ordinated in the most effective way.

It is important that the interpretation and approach between local authorities, pipeline operators, emergency services and other key stakeholders is clear and allocation of responsibilities in the event of an accident is transparent, so that the requirements for involvement in response are clearly understood.

This emergency plan is prepared under the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996. The statutory background is outlined below:

A. Pipelines Safety Regulations (PSR) 1996

    a. General duty for construction, installation, operation, maintenance in order to ensure the initial and continuing integrity of pipelines throughout their life cycle (duty of the Operator).

    b. Additional duties:

        i. Notification to HSE (duty of the Operator)

        ii. Provision of emergency shut-down valves

        iii. Major Accident Prevention Document (duty of the Operator)

        iv. "In Company" emergency procedures (duty of the Operator)

        v. Production and maintenance of emergency plans.

B. The preparation of adequate emergency plans for the designated pipelines will be undertaken by the Local Authorities or their designates.

The following responsibilities are outlined in the Regulations, for emergency plans in case of major accidents

a) A Local Authority which has been notified by the HSE that there is, or is to be, a major accident hazard pipeline in its area shall, before the pipeline is first used or within 9 months of such notification, whichever is later, and subject to paragraph (v), prepare an adequate plan detailing how an emergency relating to a possible major accident in its area will be dealt with.

b) In preparing the plan pursuant to paragraph (i), a Local Authority shall consult the Operator of the pipeline, the HSE and any other persons as appear to the Authority to be appropriate.

c) A Local Authority which has prepared a plan pursuant to paragraph (i) shall, as often as is appropriate and, in any case, at least every three years, review the plan and make such revision as is appropriate.

d) The Operator of a MAHP shall ensure that every Local Authority, through whose area the pipeline will pass, is furnished promptly with such information as it may reasonably require in preparing the plan referred to in paragraph (i).

e) It shall be deemed to be sufficient compliance with the requirement in paragraph (i) as to the time by which a plan is to be prepared, where such time is exceeded by reason of waiting for information referred to in paragraph (iv) which has been promptly required.

f) Where a pipeline passes or is to pass through the areas of two or more Local Authorities, the duties under this Regulation may be discharged by them where they prepare a single plan.

ANNEX – EMERGENCY PLAN TEMPLATE

Disclosure of Information

IMPORTANT

AS A RESULT OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE, ALL PLANS PRODUCED UNDER EUROPEAN DERIVED LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE PLACED IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, DUE TO POSSIBLE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS.

THIS INCLUDES THIS PLAN

Therefore the information contained in this plan should be treated as confidential, and only accessed by those whose duties require it.

No part of this plan or information contained within it should be copied, amended, or distributed without consultation with the ******** Emergency Planning Unit.

CONSULTEES

This plan is based upon information provided by PIPELINE operator (insert name) and was prepared by the ******** Emergency Planning Unit (EPU).

Contacting ******** EPU

The Emergency Planning Unit can be contacted via the following routes:

**********,

**********,

**********,

****

****

Email: ********

Telephone: ********

These are also the details for suggesting alterations and additions to the plan.

FORWARD

This document has been produced to meet the statutory requirements of the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 (Part III No. 25) whereby a Local Authority is required to prepare an adequate plan detailing how an emergency relating to a possible major accident involving a pipeline in this area will be dealt with.

In preparing the plan pursuant to the above, the authors have consulted the Operators of the pipelines subject to the Regulations, the Health and Safety Executive, the Emergency Services, and other appropriate stakeholders.

References to technical terms, terminology and associated detail have been produced in the Plans following consultation with individual Pipeline Operators and from reference to:-

- Statutory Instrument 1996 No. 825: Health and Safety, The Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996
- Health and Safety Executive 'A guide to the Pipelines Safety Regulations' 1996 (HSE L82)
- Health and Safety Executive 'Further Guidance on Emergency Plans for Major Accident Hazard Pipelines' (Guidance)
- Information for Local Authority Emergency Planners
- Civil Contingencies Act (2004), Emergency Preparedness Guidance (2012) and accompanying guidance
- Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP)

1 PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT

This document forms part of a suite of plans used by agencies operating in the ******** Resilience Forum area to facilitate a safe, coordinated multi-agency response to a Major Accident Hazard Pipeline (MAHP) Emergency in the area.

The plans have been drawn up in accordance with the legal obligations placed on Local Authorities under the Pipelines Safety Regulations (PSR) 1996. This plan specifically relates to the protection of the health and safety of people

Consultations have taken place with pipeline operators, Emergency Services, NHS England, Public Health England, HSE and with members of the public via their Elected Members.

This type of incident is defined as a MAHP Emergency which means an occurrence i.e. an explosion, fire or breach of a MAHP. This is further defined as a Mobile Cloudburst - an incident involving a release of chemicals or toxic substances at any location (usually during transportation) i.e. highways, railways, ships and pipelines and not relating to a specific site i.e. a Control Of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) site.

Note: A declaration of a MAHP or Cloudburst emergency should be treated as a major incident within the area and should generate the same command and control response.

The MAHP plan takes into account the nature of the substance transported in the MAHP and the likely effects on the community of a loss of containment. MAHPs are present in many parts of the area and are often located in close proximity to each other. Leaks from designated MAHPs are rare and vary in size and effect dependent on the substance released.

Substances can be toxic, asphyxiant, flammable, explosive and cryogenic; some of these can be detected in very small concentrations at considerable distances.

This plan has been drawn up by the ********Emergency Planning Team (on behalf of ******** councils) in accordance with the legal duty to prepare such plans placed upon them by the Pipeline Safety Regulation 1996. This plan relates to MAHPs and their operators in the ******** council areas and should be read in conjunction with the Local Authorities Generic Response Plan(s) and Contacts Directory(s)

1.1 Objectives

- Containing and controlling incidents as to minimize the effects and to limit damage to persons, the environment and property
- Implementing the measures necessary to protect persons and the environment from the effects of Major Accidents
- Communicating the necessary information to the public and to the Emergency Services and authorities concerned in the area

1.2 Reviewing and Testing

The MAHP Response Plan will be reviewed at least every 3 years.

Note: Under the Pipelines Safety Regulation 1996 there is no specific duty on Local Authorities to test the plan, but exercises may be carried out as part of duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

This pipeline plan is designed to dovetail with procedures prepared under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004), Emergency Preparedness Guidance (2012) and COMAH off-site emergency plans.

1.3 Recipients Responsibilities

Recipients of this document are asked to:

- Ensure its safe custody
- Send details of any amendments to ********@********.gov.uk
- Ensure any hard copies of documents are amended/ destroyed as appropriate when updates are provided

1.4 Record of Amendments

Amendments	Reviewing Authority	Issue Date
Plan rewritten and Issued		

2 NOTIFICATION

An incident involving a high-pressure pipeline is readily identified by one or more of the following features:

- Release of Gas
- Depressurisation Blast Effect and Projectiles
- Fire and Explosion
- Noise
- Thermal Radiation
- Overpressure
- Toxicity
- Temperature Chill.

The first notification of any incident involving a pipeline may be made to 999 or the Pipeline Operator from a number of sources. These may include members of the public, farmers through whose land the pipeline passes, third parties such as plant operators excavating in the vicinity of the pipeline and water users where the pipeline traverse's rivers and streams. The relevant Local Authority will be notified by ********** Police.

If the initial notification of a pipeline incident is not as described above or is provided by another agency, e.g., public or media, it may be necessary to evaluate the source and confirm part, or all of the information. A loss of containment or the effect of a release may be reported via 999 or alternatively to the Environment Agency.

The Emergency Services and Pipeline Operators will follow their standard procedures to investigate reports. If at any stage they identify a requirement for additional resources, a mutual decision is taken to notify other organisations and undertake wider coordination. It is possible that the Pipeline Operator, before the arrival of the Emergency Services, could declare an incident involving a MAHP Emergency upon arrival at a reported incident. Alternatively, a minor incident could escalate, and on their arrival the ********** Police or ********** Fire and Rescue Service may identify a major incident.



Figure.7.Possible.Notification.Cascade

3 EMERGENCY MESSAGE

The following message will be sent **via a 999 emergency call** to ******** Fire and Rescue Service:	
Major Accident Hazard Pipeline (MAHP) Emergency Message	'This is the Major Accident Hazard Pipeline Emergency Message.'
Exact Location	Exact Location of Incident? Grid Reference? *(If known)* What3Words location? *(If known)* MAHP Pipeline Operator? *(If known)*
Type of Incident	High Pressure Pipeline Incident Fire / Leaking / Emergency (delete as appropriate)
Hazards	Substance involved? Diameter of the MAHP? *(If known)* Pressure in the MAHP? *(If known)* Estimated time for pipe to de-pressure? *(If known)*
Access (if known)	Wind Direction? From: To:
	Wind Speed (mph)?
	Map No.? (If known) Which Sectors are affected? (Identify at least 3 if known)
	Best safe Access Route is via? (If known)
Number / Type / Severity of Casualties	Any known casualties? Number Type and Severity?
Emergency Services present or required	If Ambulance and/or Police are **immediately** required, contact them, directly with **additional 999** calls with the above information.

4 PIPELINES IN THE AREA

The ******** Emergency Planning Unit has been informed by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) that there are numerous pipelines in the area of the ******** which fall within the scope of the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 (PSR).

The pipeline network extends to over *** kilometres including spurs etc. within ********** and into neighbouring counties (******* and ********).

Name of Operator	KM of MAHPs
*******	*******
*******	*******
*******	*******
*******	*******
*******	*******
*******	*******
*******	*******

Table.7.MAHP.Operators.in.the.\\\\\\\Area¡

5 UKOPA DEFINITIONS OF LEVELS OF PIPELINE EMERGENCIES

5.1 Level 1: MINOR Emergency

A minor incident that involves checks and corrective action by the Pipeline Operator only, has no immediate impact on the public or the environment and does not require the attendance of the emergency services.

5.2 Level 2: LOCAL Emergency

An incident being investigated by the Pipeline Operator has no immediate impact on the public or the environment but may require the attendance of the Emergency Services to ensure it is dealt with safely.

5.3 Level 3: PIPELINE Emergency

An incident requiring the attendance of the Emergency Services, but does not put the general public or wider environment at risk. The effects can be seen to be contained with no expectation of escalation.

5.4 Level 4: PIPELINE MAJOR Emergency

A major incident that requires the implementation of the Local Authority Emergency Plan. This type of incident will fit with the Government definition of a major incident in “Dealing with a Disaster”:

- Affects a large number of people
- Causes significant public disruption
- Results in many injuries
- Causes major environmental damage
- Requires a significant response from many agencies.

6 PROPERTIES OF SUBSTANCES

ENTER PRODUCT SPECIFIC INFORMATION HERE EXAMPLE SHOWN

The MAHPs carry the following substances:

- Natural Gas (Methane)
- Ethylene
- Propylene
- Ammonia Vinyl Chloride Monomer

6.1 Hazards of substances:

6.1.1 Natural Gas (Methane)

- Flammable gas
- Can be odourised or non-odourised

The most significant in terms of hazard ranges is the effect of thermal radiation should the gas subsequently ignite; if a release occurs that is not initially ignited, ignition of the gas could potentially occur at any time. Steps should be taken to ensure that potential ignition sources are not introduced into the area around the release where gas could potentially be present in flammable concentration

Gas is lighter than air and the majority of failures are expected to lead to gas jets that are orientated vertically upwards. The extent of the flammable gas cloud at ground level for the majority of situations would therefore be expected to be negligible or only of the order of a few metres.

6.1.2 Ethylene

- Extremely flammable gas.
- In pressurised gas form can explode if heated
- Risk from thermal radiation if ignited
- Debris throw potential from a very high-pressure release from an underground pipeline with soil and stones being discharge from the crater formed
- May cause drowsiness or dizziness or at very high concentrations could result in oxygen deficiency
- Keep away from heat, hot surfaces, sparks, open flames and other ignition sources. No smoking. Use only outdoors or in a well-ventilated area. Avoid breathing gas

6.1.3 Propylene

- Flammable gas
- Reacts violently with strong oxidising agents
- Vapours may travel across the ground and reach remote ignition sources causing a flashback fire danger. May form flammable/ explosive vapour-air mixture
- High gas concentrations will displace available oxygen from the air; unconsciousness and death may occur suddenly from lack of oxygen
- Vapours may cause drowsiness and dizziness and expected to be slightly irritating.
- Exposure to rapidly expanding gases may cause frost burns to eyes and/or skin.
- Possibility of organ or organ system damage from prolonged exposure

Prevention: Avoid catalysts and conditions that promote oxidation, addition or substitution. Propylene reacts vigorously with oxidizing materials and with nitrogen dioxide, dinitrogen tetroxide and dinitrogen oxide.

6.1.4 Ammonia

- Non-Flammable but in certain concentrations when mixed with air could explode if ignited
- Strong smell (similar to urine)
- Can be corrosive
- Breathing in low levels may cause irritation to the eyes, nose and throat; in high levels it may cause burns and swelling in the airways, lung damage and can be fatal.
- Liquid ammonia has far more significant impacts than in its gaseous form

7 INDICATIVE CORDONS

7.1 Hazard Planning Distances

Three distances are referred to in this document for the purposes of developing and implementing emergency plans, these are:

- The Emergency Planning Distance
- The Maximum Thermal Hazard Range
- A Safe Distance for emergency control points.

7.1.1 The Emergency Planning Distances

“The emergency planning distance is that distance where a detailed emergency plan has to be prepared for the worst credible, or reference, accident and should be agreed by the local authority and pipeline operator”

7.1.2 Maximum Thermal Hazard Range

The Maximum Thermal Hazard Range is the maximum distance away from the pipeline where it is calculated that individuals could come to harm as a result of a pipeline failure and the resulting thermal radiation if the resultant gas escape ignites. The Maximum Thermal Hazard Range assumes a full-bore pipeline failure (rupture).

7.1.3 A Safe Distance for Emergency Control Points / General Public

If Emergency Control Points are being set up it is suggested that the Emergency Control Points should initially be located at or beyond the Outer Cordon.

7.1.4 Ignition and Thermal Effects

Effects of ignition depend on the amount of product released, i.e. the pipeline diameter, pressure, size of rupture etc.

Ignition of the release could result in a fireball (worst case) or a pressurised jet fire.

Vapour cloud explosion

(ENTER PRODUCT SPECIFIC INFORMATION IF REQUIRED)

7.2 Natural Gas Hazard Distances:

Size or Pressure of Pipeline	Emergency Hazard distance/ Initial Inner Cordon
1219 mm AND > 70 bar g	900 metres
> 610 mm OR > 40 bar g	750 metres
< 610 mm OR < bar g	500 metres

7.3 Ethylene Hazard Distances:

Pipeline diameter	Emergency Hazard distance/ Initial Inner Cordon
219 mm	120 metres
273 mm	165 metres
200 mm	200 metres

7.4 Liquid Hydrocarbon Propylene (Classed as MAHP)

Maximum Operating Pressure	Maximum Thermal Hazard Range
40 bar g	80 metres
60 bar g	120 metres
80 bar g	160 metres
100 bar g	200 metres

7.5 Ammonia

Emergency Hazard distance/ Initial Inner Cordon
Non-essential personnel - 120 metres

8 IMMEDIATE RESPONSE

When attending an incident involving a MAHP, staff of MAHP operators and members of the three emergency services and other agencies as appropriate will attend the Forward Control Point (FCP).

All response personnel must receive comprehensive briefings on the hazards and risks before entering the incident area.

Following the notification of a Major Incident/ Major Incident Standby (MI/ MIS) immediate, simultaneous action will be taken by each of the responding agencies as outlined in section.

The following sections outline the initial actions of the MAHP operators and key responding agencies.

8.1 Pipeline Operator

- Undertake a diagnostic period
- Establish which MAHP operator has the faulty pipeline and inform ********** FRS
- Agree with the other Emergency services on a suitable rendezvous point (RVP) for the first attendance
- Liaise fully with ********** FRS

Once the diagnostic period is concluded, the MAHP operator will:

- Confirm the full details of the MAHP emergency to Fire Control and the police
- Agree with the other Emergency services on the location of operational control (control point).
- Deploy a liaison officer to the RVP/ Forward Control Point to liaise with all responsible agencies regarding Fire and Rescue Service operational response issues.
- Deploy a liaison officer to the Joint Tactical Coordinating Centre (JTCC) to liaise with the Police Incident Commander on the company aspects of the Tactical response. If staffing limitations of the operator prevent an in-person presence a dial-in option will be made available through MS Teams to a person of appropriate seniority at the company

8.1.1 Pipeline Emergency Response Officer (PERO) Role

The initial role of the PERO is to as quickly as possible provide technical support to the Emergency Services, Local Authority and Scientific and Technical Advice Cell. The PERO will then establish an Operator presence at the incident as soon as practicable and a communication link at the incident site with the SSC and SECC.

The PERO provides specialist knowledge of the impact of the leakage, resources and equipment required and co-ordinates communications from the incident site to the SSC and SECC.

The PERO may be identified by a high visibility vest with 'PERO' on the back and will also carry an Operator identification card. Details of the PERO vehicle may be forwarded to the Emergency Services.

8.2 Fire and Rescue Service

********** Fire and Rescue Service may receive warning of a suspected MAHP Emergency and its location either direct from the 999 system, from the other Emergency Services, from the Local Authority or from the MAHP Operators.

If it is necessary to establish an inner cordon, the Senior Fire Officer will be responsible for the health and safety of all those entering the inner cordon. (However, in the event of an incident which is, or is suspected to involve terrorist activity, all movements in and out of the inner cordons will be under the direct supervision of the Senior Police Officer at the incident).

Fire Control will:

- Transmit the suspected MAHP Emergency notification to Police Control, Ambulance Control, the MAHP Operator (if known) and Local Authority
- Will deploy the Fire and Rescue Service Pre-Determined Attendance (PDA) to the position of the Leak Report.

Once the Diagnostic Period has concluded, the MAHP Operator will confirm the full details of the MAHP emergency to FIRE CONTROL. Fire Control will:

- Compile and transmit the full MAHP EMERGENCY MESSAGE as detailed in Section 3
- Once a Rendezvous Point (RVP) has been identified direct the PDA to go there
- Deploy a Fire Service Manager to the RVP (Operational Control Point), his/her role will be to liaise with all responsible Agencies regarding Fire Service operational response issues
- Deploy two Fire Service Managers to the Joint Tactical Coordinating Centre (JTCC) and require those Managers to liaise with the Police Incident Commander on ********** Fire and Rescue Service aspects of tactical response
- In discussion with ********** Ambulance Service agree any decontamination procedures as required by response personnel and members of the public
- Render such specialist assistance as may be required by the circumstances of the MAHP emergency, including the provision of specialist equipment available from Fire and Rescue Service resources
- Liaise fully with the MAHP Operator (and other MAHP Operators as appropriate).
- Preventing further escalation of the incident by intervention, dealing with released chemicals and other hazardous situations.
- Arranging for Local Authority and other organisations' support, as required via the ********** Emergency Planning Unit Duty Officer.

8.3 Police

On receipt of a MAHP Initial Message (MIS):

The Force Incident Manager will:

- Invoke appropriate contingency plan.
- Notify agencies in accordance with the cascade that a major incident has been declared in line with the ********** Response Manual, and MAHP message shared.
- In consultation with the Fire and Rescue Service identify the emergency services Rendezvous point (RVP).
- Mobilise operational resources and provide deploy an Operational Commander to the RVP
- Establish and maintain the outer cordon.
- Establish the Joint Tactical Coordination Centre (JTCC) at ********** Police Headquarters, ********** and Coordinate the multi-agency response.
- A Police Tactical Commander will be notified and attend the JTCC and initially assume the role of the chair of the Tactical Coordination Group (TCG) Meetings.
- Establish the Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) if required.
- Coordinate the arrangements for public information through the Police Media Department, with coordination with the pipeline operator.
- Co-ordinate the flow of information and health advice to the public as provided by the Company and health professionals.

8.4 Ambulance

On receipt of the MAHP initial message:

Notify:

- NHS England (NHSE)
- Notify ********** Integrated Care Board 1st On Call (Tactical) for **********
- Designated Primary and Secondary Receiving Hospitals
- United Kingdom Health Security Agency (UKHSA)
- Deploy personnel to the RVP once confirmed by the Fire and Rescue Service that it is safe to do so.

On receipt of the full MAHP message:

- Deploy one or more officers to attend the JTCC at Police Headquarters

- Ensure the Ambulance Service Press Officer to makes contact with the Police Press Officer
- Triage, treat and care for those injured at the scene either directly or with assistance of other medical personnel
- Determine, either directly or in conjunction with medical personnel the priority evacuation of those injured
- Ensure adequate resources are available at the incident scene
- Provide communications facilities for NHS resources at the scene

8.5 Local Authority

- Activate the specific plan and operational plans as appropriate
- Mobilise and deploy services as appropriate in support of the emergency services
- Establish the Local Authority Emergency Centre and arrange for a senior officer to undertake the role of Borough Emergency Coordinator (BEC) to coordinate the council response
- Arrange for an appropriate member of staff to attend the JTCC (TCG)
- If activated arrange for an appropriate member of staff to attend the SCG
- Notify the Director for public health who may be required to attend the STAC
- Where appropriate deploy environmental Health Officer to STAC
- Ensure that the councils press office makes contact with ********** Police Press office
- Ensure public facing contact centres are informed as incident details emerge

8.6 NHS England

- Activate response plans as appropriate
- Ensure that ********** Integrated Care Board have been notified of the incident
- Coordinate the response of NHS organisations and providers of NHS funded care via in partnership with the ICB
- Deploy appropriate resources to the JTCG
- If established, deploy an appropriate representative to the SCG

8.7 Integrated Care Board

- Activate response plans as appropriate
- Coordinate the response of NHS organisations and providers of NHS funded care.

- Work in partnership with NHS England ********** as required.
- Deploy appropriate resources to the JTCG
- If established, deploy an appropriate representative to the SCG

8.8 United Kingdom Health Security Agency (UKHSA)

- Activate operational plans as appropriate
- Provide public health advice for the multi-agency response
- Activate and provide an appropriate chair at the STAC

8.9 HM Coastguard

- Confirm the location of the site in relation to the River **********.
- Check local weather, the weather at ********** Airport and the actual forecast.
- If necessary, make regular broadcasts to shipping.
- Ensure that local Marinas, Yacht Clubs and the Mersey Inshore Rescue are informed.

8.10 Environment Agency

Whilst having no specified role under the Pipelines Safety Regulations, the Environment Agency must be notified of the occurrence of all major accidents at a COMAH establishment so that a joint investigation with the HSE can be commenced, pursuant to the requirements of COMAH Regulation 19(4).

The Environment Agency wishes to be informed about any major accident that has led or may lead to pollution of the environment whether air, water (including “controlled waters” and sewers) or land. Controlled waters include most surface and ground waters and coastal waters up to 3 miles out to sea (Section 104 Water Resources Act, 1991) which was amended by the Water Act 2003 and 2014.

- Activate operational plans as appropriate
- Where possible arrange other forms of assistance, e.g., with manpower, plant and vehicles
- Ensure all waste arising from the incident is disposed of (by those responsible) in an environmentally safe manner and in accordance with current legislation
- Establish an Air Quality Cell where there is an impact on air quality

Note: The Agency is not responsible for delivering pollution mitigation responses following major accidents. The Regulations require the Operator to identify accident scenarios, determine who and what in the environment is at risk and to determine the potential impacts and their likelihood.

8.11 Health and Safety Executive

It is the responsibility of the Operator to notify the Health and Safety Executive of a Major Incident. HM Inspectors of Health and Safety of the Hazardous Installations Directorate, Chemical Industries Division, will provide appropriate advice and guidance.

The HSE is not an emergency service, but outside of normal office hours they may be contacted through the Duty Officer System. ********** Police have the phone number for this service.

9 MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

Media channels should be used to provide advice and reassurance to the public. A media Management Framework is in place in ********** to ensure a coordinated media response across agencies. The plan outlines protocols for the delivery of an effective multi-agency media response. Coordinated by the police agencies (including companies) are expected to:

- Cooperate and share information
- Agree public messages which:
    - Are restricted to factual and confirmed information
    - Will not jeopardise the response effort, any criminal investigation or the safety of the public if released
- Issue their own press statements, social media and web site releases dealing with matters within their remit
- Make early contact with the police press office on the timing and detail of public messages and press releases
- Share copies of press releases with other agencies
- Ensure their nominated media officers have the technology and resources to be self-sufficient in generating and issuing press releases and communicating with other agencies

9.1 Media Liaison Point

In the early stages of the incident a media liaison point (MLP) at a forward but safe distance from the incident will be identified for news crews. A Police press officer will coordinate the flow of information to the media at the MLP. Other press officers may also attend to brief the media

9.2 Media Briefing Centre

In an extended incident it may be necessary to establish a formal facility as a Media Briefing Centre. This centre, located in a safe but forward area will act as an operational base for press officers of all agencies and will be used for formal press conferences.

The JTCC will identify facilities which could potentially be used for this purpose

All agencies will maintain records of their news releases to facilitate a thorough debrief and evaluation of the media arrangements.

10 OFF SITE COMMAND AND CONTROL

10.1 Multi-agency Off Site Command and Control

A Major Incident/ Major Incident Standby will require the resources of multiple agencies throughout the incident from the emergency services and key responding agencies in the initial stages of the incident to the longer term supporting and advisory roles performed by other agencies as the incident progresses.

10.2 Operational Response

The operational level of response is usually the first established and is where the immediate 'hands on' work is undertaken near the site of an incident (at a safe RVP) and other affected areas. Agencies will command their own resources but will work together to:

- Assess the nature and extent of the incident
- Establish cordons

Undertake actions as appropriate to mitigate the impacts of the incident, save lives and protect property

10.3 Tactical Response – Joint Tactical Coordinating Centre (JTCC)

A Joint Tactical Coordinating Centre will be established at ********** Police Headquarters, to coordinate the tactical response.

The purpose of the JTCC is to:

- Assess the nature and extent of the incident and agree an appropriate response
- Determine priorities for allocating available resources
- Obtain additional resources if required
- Assess risks and use this to inform the operational response (this includes the use of resources that may have implicit ignition sources such as radios or drones)
- Ensure the Health, Safety and Welfare of the public and personnel Consider the need for the strategic level of command to be established

Consider the need for the strategic level of command to be established.

10.4 Strategic Response – Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG)

As a general rule in **********, the response is coordinated at the tactical level, however, depending on the scale and implications of the incident there may be a requirement to establish a Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) to:

- Define and communicate the overarching strategy and objectives for the overall multi-agency response

- Consider the emergency in its longer term and wider context (such as potential impact on aviation/ air traffic control in the area)
- Provide strategic direction to the JTCC

Monitor the context, risks, impacts and progress towards defined objectives.

10.5 Local Authority Emergency Centre (LAEC)

The lead Local Authority will establish an Emergency Centre in a pre-designated location (see specific plans). As a rule, attended only by Local Authority staff, the purpose of the LAEC is to:

- Coordinate the council response
- Consider requests for assistance from the emergency services and deploy resources as appropriate
- Coordinate all information and requests for assistance/ advice from members of the public, elected members and council services.

10.6 Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

In the initial stages of a MAHP Emergency there are likely to be questions from responders and members of the public as to the likely risk to human health. While these can usually be answered initially by UK Health Security Agency and the Local Authority Director of Public Health, there is likely to be a requirement for wider and longer-term advice. A Science and Technical Advice Cell will be established to:

- Advise the JTCC or the SCG if established on:
    - The Impact on the health of the population
    - Public Safety
    - Environmental Protection
    - Sampling and monitoring of any contaminants
- Provide a common source of scientific and technical advice
- Coordinate the responding scientific and technical community
- Pool available information and seek a common view on scientific and technical merits of different courses of action
- Identify other agencies/ individuals with specialist advice who may be required to join the cell to inform the response

Further Guidance on the STAC can be found at the following Links:

National STAC Guidance

11 JOINT EMERGENCY SERVICES INTEROPERABILITY PRINCIPLES (JESIP)

Successful Integrated Emergency Management is the effective coordination of, not just the emergency services (Fire, Police and Ambulance) but numerous other agencies and organisations referred to as Category 1 and 2 responders. For this to be a success, accurate, succinct, timely and relevant communication must take place at all levels of management and command across involved agencies and organisations.

The aim of JESIP is to enable this communication.

The police will normally co-ordinate the activities of those responding to a land-based sudden impact emergency, at and around the scene. There are however exceptions, for example, a fire and rescue authority would co-ordinate the response at the scene for a major fire. The overarching identified aims are likely to be:

- Protect and preserve life
- Mitigate and minimise the impact of challenging events
- Maintain life support infrastructure and essential services
- Promote restoration and improvement activity in the aftermath of a challenging event

The Principles



If the principles are followed then the result should be a jointly agreed working strategy where all parties understand what is going to happen when and by who, this strategy should include:

- **What** are the aims and objectives to be achieved?
- **Who by** – police, fire, ambulance and partner organisations?
- **When** – timescales, deadlines and milestones
- **Where** – what locations?
- **Why** – what is the rationale? Is this consistent with the overall aims and objectives?
- **How** are these tasks going to be achieved?

In a Major Incident, including 'Cloudburst, details will be passed between responders following the 'METHANE' format:

M	Major Incident – Cloudburst is always a Major Incident.
E	Exact location
T	Type of incident e.g. explosion, building collapse
H	Hazards present, potential or suspected
A	Access – routes that are safe to use
N	Number, type, severity of casualties
E	Emergency Services present and those required

11.1 Operational Command - Co-Located JESIP

A JESIP Operational Command is now considered an essential part of the successful Command and Control of any Major Incident. At a minimum Police, Fire and Ambulance Commanders will co-locate, with other agency/ organisation managers as appropriate, as close as is safe to the scene of an incident.

The JESIP Commanders will remain on standby at the RVP until called forward.

11.2 Tactical Command - Co-Located JESIP

Joint Tactical Command Centre, convened at ********** Police Headquarters, under this MAHP Plan, will be fully compliant with JESIP Principles at the tactical level of command.

Further information is available on JESIP website

12 STAND DOWN ARRANGEMENTS

It is likely to be some considerable time after a MAHP incident that is in a position to be stood down.

The decision to declare a stand down of the emergency phase of the incident will be taken by the highest level of multi-agency command once the following criteria has been reached:

- The incident has been brought under control
- There is no or minimal likelihood of a re-occurrence
- Levels of toxicity in the community have been assessed and considered to be at a safe level
- Members of the public safe to resume normal unrestricted life activities

At the point that stand down has been agreed, the company will be asked to activate the public warning and informing measures in their off-site specific plan to advise those in the Public Information Zone that the incident is under control.

13 CONTACT NUMBERS

Organisation	Number
Pipeline Operator	
Emergency Services	
********** Fire and Rescue Service HQ	
********** Police	
Harbour Police	
Police CSU Vehicle	
Ambulance	
HM Coastguard	
Local Authority	
********** Emergency Planning Unit	
Acute Hospitals	
Agencies	
Environment Agency LA Line (24hr)	
Environment Agency Switchboard	
Food Standards Agency Duty Officer	
Food Standards Agency Switchboard	
Health and Safety Executive	
Health and Safety Executive Duty Officer	
Health Protection Agency **********	
********** Regional Resilience Team	
Met Office EMARC (for Chemet etc.)	
Utilities and Transport	
Harbour Master, Port Operations Centre	
********** PD Ports (Head Office)	
********** Water Head Office Mon-Fri	
Network Rail ********** Control Room (24hrs)	
********** Electric (Network Control Centre - restricted)	
********** Electric Customer Relations Centre	
National Grid (ESO)	
National Power	
National Gas Emergency Number	

14 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AGI	Above Ground Installation
AIO	Ambulance Incident Officer
BCO (CCO)	Borough Co-Ordination Officer (County Co-ordination Officer)
CCA	Civil Contingencies Act 2004
CEPU	Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit
CHEMDATA	Chemical Hazards Database
CHEMET	Chemical Meteorology
COMAH	Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 2015
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs
DFT	Department for Transport
EA	Environment Agency
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EMARC	Emergency Monitoring and Response Centre
EPO	Emergency Planning Officer
*EPU	********* Emergency Planning Unit
EPWG	Emergency Planning Working Group
HSE	Health and Safety Executive
JDM	Joint Decision Mode
JESIP	Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Programme
JOL	Joint Organisational Learning
MAHP	Major Accident Hazard Pipeline
MCA	Maritime Coastguard Agency
MECC	Major Emergency Control Centre
MIO	Medical Incident Officer
MMT	Mobile Medical Team
MRSC	Maritime Rescue Sub Centre
NAME	Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment
PACRAM	Procedures & Communications in the event of a release of Radioactive Material
PCC	Pipeline Control Centre
PDA	Pre-Determined Attendance

PSR	Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996
RCCC	Regional Civil Contingencies Committee
RNC	Regional Nominated Co-ordinator
RRT	Regional Resilience Team
SAR	Search and Rescue
SCC	Secondary Control Centre
SIC	Site Incident Controller
SMC	Site Main Controller
SSSI	Site of Special Scientific Interest

15 DISTRIBUTION LIST

Location	Copy Numbers
Operator	1-2 & 1 electronic
**********	3-4 & 4 electronic
********** Emergency Centre	5
********** Emergency Centre	6
********** Emergency Centre	7
********** Emergency Centre	8
********** Emergency Planning Unit	9
Police Command Room (EPU Cabinet)	10
********** Police	11
********** Fire and Rescue Service	12
********** Ambulance Service	13
********** Electric PLC	14
********** Gas	15
********** Water	16
Health and Safety Executive	17
********** Civil Contingencies Unit	18
********** Emergency Planning Unit	19